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 The Institutional Fragmentation of International Intellectual Property Law in 
Pacific Rim:  
Authority and Legitimacy, Regime Interaction and Future Institutional 
Development in a “World Society” 
Anlei ZUO * 
(Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong) 
zuoanlei2010law@gmail.com 
 
Abstract 
Under the context of institutional fragmentation of international IP law in this world society, 
the international IP law in Pacific Rim is in a flux with various international IP legal actors, 
including TRIPS, WIPO, CBD, TPP, RECP, FTAAP, etc. With the method of socio-legal 
analysis emphasizing and basing itself on authority and legitimacy, interaction of IP regimes 
and future institutional development, this paper investigates the historical evolution of 
international IP regimes in Pacific Rim and their interactions, paying particular attention to 
the analysis of two concepts (authority and legitimacy) onto those international IP regimes 
and their competitive gaming. The present literatures have shed light on some 
inter-institutional interactions and forum competitions in some subfields of international law 
(like International Law of the Sea, International Environmental Protection, International 
Fishery Regulation) as well as some international IP regimes and normative rules specifically, 
with some descriptive, analytical and interpretative insights unfolded, notwithstanding the 
lack of deep-going studies focusing on the evolutionary changes and regime competition 
contextualized from a systematic and structural perspective. After the examination of the 
current configuration of international IP legal regimes in the Pacific Rim, the core research 
questions hereinto consist of: how this “institutional fragmentation” would affect the 
authority and legitimacy of international IP legal regimes and subsequently the international 
law-making process in international IP law; and what kinds of further implications for future 
institutional development of international IP law can be deduced. Then predictable trends on 
the institutional developments and its fragmentation of Pacific Rim’s international IP law, 
mainly driven forward by China and US, could be deduced. 
 
Keywords: Institutional Fragmentation; International IP Law; The Pacific Rim; A World 
Society; Authority and Legitimacy; Regime Interaction 
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I drift like a cloud, 
Across these venerable eastern lands, 
A journey of unfathomable distances, 
An endless scroll of experiences... 
Lady Zhejiang here we must part, 
For the next province awaits my embrace. 
Sad wanderer, once you conquer the East, 
Where do you go? 
Carter, Tom. China: Portrait of a People (2008) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
International intellectual property law (international IP law), as closely connected to 
technological progress,1 cultural development, social change and modernization, 
international trade and global environmental protection, 2  etc., 3  is one of the 
international legal fields in desperate need of systematic research under the backdrop 
of the globalization and the so-called “fragmentation of international law”. In this 
so-called global harmonization of intellectual property legal protection rules, 4 
international and regional IP regimes play a quite significant role in fueling the march. 
Due to different law-making authorities and different legal rules embodied in 
international treaties or executed in corresponding international organizations, the 
alleged “fragmentation of international IP law” becomes a significant issue in Public 
International Law and International Economic Law, which has potentials to affect the 
contemporary construction of international IP regime and the future evolutionary 
direction of the international community legal system.  
 
Although some scholars assert that different fields of international law reveal the 
same structure and landscape of international law, it is never agreed to ignore the 
attributes and particularity of a certain subject.5 So does intellectual property in 
international law, and necessarily even more. This sort of case study on the 
international intellectual property law could likely reveal quite a few glimpses of 
some deep and easily neglected traits of international law-making and regime 
interaction, in addition to perceptions on the institutional fragmentation of 
international IP law specifically.6 The following are several main considerations to 
                                                          
1 See Ruttan, Vernon W., and Yujiro Hayami. Toward a Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation. 
The Journal of Development Studies 20.4 (1984): 203-223. 
2 Although some scholar may argue about the precise degree of IP’s influence on those issues, but IP 
are always entangled with them. See Barnett, Jonathan M. Is Intellectual Property Trivial? University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review (2009): 1691-1742. 
3 See Keith Maskus. Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economics of Intellectual 
Property in the 21st Century. Washington: Peterson Institute, 2012.  
4 See Coombe, Rosemary J. Intellectual Property, Human Rights & (and) Sovereignty: New Dilemmas 
in International Law Posed by Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of 
Biodiversity. Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 6 (1998): 59. 
5 See Hofmann, Rainer. Unity and Diversity in International Law. Ed. Andreas Zimmermann. Duncker 
und Humblot, 2006, p 218. 
6  Actually, on the other hand, this public international law thinking onto certain subfield of 
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select the international IP law as the research subject of this thesis.  
 
Firstly, the historical development process of international intellectual property law 
and its current developmental landscape make it extraordinarily suitable for the study 
of institutional fragmentation of international law and further on for the understanding 
of the ontological “ethos”7 of international legal rules. For example, coexistence of 
principles of intellectual property protection (for example, the principle of 
territoriality)8, the globalization of private power,9 and the rapid harmonization of 
international IP law seem to be paradoxical; and that not only makes the international 
regulation of IP protection tend to be more controversial and technically fragmented, 
but also makes it more elusive and captivating. Meanwhile, the landscape of the 
present international IP law, which is an integrated and dynamic part of international 
trade law, is relatively clear and organized (with TRIPs and WIPO as the two main 
pillars, and other potentially evolving multilateral regimes) compared to other fields 
of international regulation. What are the secrets of international IP law to get ahead so 
quickly despite that there are always and still many institutional difficulties at 
different stages? How could it handle the issue of legitimacy when developed and 
developing countries are having big gaps regarding the regulation modes and 
protection criteria? How should we understand, evaluate and even appropriately 
rebuild the link between international IP law and international trade law (also other 
sub-topics therein)? All those facts and unknowns on the international plane make 
international IP law worthwhile for comprehensive investigations, contemplations and 
also theoretically imaginative reconstructions. Secondly, intellectual property’s own 
unique characteristics and its close interlink with many important issues make the 
study on international IP law have strong representative role for the study of 
institutional fragmentation of international law.10 Taking the public interests and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
international economic law area not only is quite helpful and necessary for new understanding of the 
whole landscape of international law, but also could innovatively contribute to the essential “evolution” 
or “renaissance” of the specific topics, etc. See Schill, Stephan W. W (h) ither Fragmentation? On the 
Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law. European Journal of International Law 22.3 
(2011): 875-908. 899, 902. (“International public law thinking thus helps to counter concerns about 
fragmentation arising out of the specialization of international investment law in two directions: …”) 
7  ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 
finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 14, par. 15. 
8 See Bradley, Curtis A. Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in An Age of Globalism. Va. J. Int’l L. 
37 (1996): 505. 
9 See Sell, Susan K. Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights. Vol. 
88. Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
10 Academics can get a glimpse of the importance and complexity of the topic of intellectual property 
from the two series of monographs on IP. See “Cambridge Intellectual Property and Information Law” 
series and “Information Technology and Law” series. Available at 
http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/law/international-trade-law/series/cambridge-intellect
ual-property-and-information-law. 
http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/law/law-general-interest/series/information-technolog
y-and-law?options%5B%5D=Unavailable%2Btitles. (“As its economic potential has rapidly expanded, 
intellectual property has become a subject of prime legal importance. The roots of the subject have 
been formed in national laws. Now it is branching out rapidly. It has to reflect today's technological 
advances, notably in digitization and genetics, and to secure a central place for intellectual property in 
world trade. Regional and international law, allied to comparative law studies, have become essential 
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collective benefit-sharing for instance, IP is closely related to public space and public 
interests, including the access to information and freedom of speech,11 access to basic 
medicine and public health,12 agriculture and transgenic technology,13 biodiversity 
and protection of traditional knowledge,14  environmental protection and human 
rights, 15  climate change and transfer of technology, 16  etc. 17  That’s because 
intellectual property is always something about information, technology, their 
commercial industrialization and public policies. Thirdly and obviously, systematic 
study on the institutional fragmentation phenomenon of international IP law is almost 
empty, largely unexplored and still imprisoned.18 Therefore, theoretical interpretation 
of historical development of international IP institutions and summary understanding 
of the logic of international regimes’ evolution as well as international law-making, 
based on empirical investigations and practical conditions, are more than needed. 
 
In general, legal studies of the fragmentation issue are mainly focused on two aspects 
(institutional and normative conflict). Despite that scholars have quite divergent 
thoughts on whether and how it could be resolved, the institutional fragmentation 
aspect is one of the most foundational issues since it is the premise of so many other 
problems,19 not to mention that it is tightly linked with the legal jurisdiction and the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
elements in the rapid legal developments which engulf the subject.”) 
11 For example, see Reichman, J. H., and Jonathan A. Franklin. Privately Legislated Intellectual 
Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information. University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 147.4 (1999): 875. (“How to reconcile freedom of contract with the 
functional preservation of public good uses of information instead ought to pose a crucial problem for 
any project to devise a comprehensive set of default rules governing ‘computer information 
transaction[s]’.”) Also see Reichman, J. H., and Paul F. Uhlir. A Contractually Reconstructed Research 
Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment. Law and 
Contemporary Problems 66.1 (2003): 315-462. (“However, that inherently dynamic and shifting 
balance of interests has come under intense pressure in recent years for a number of different reasons. 
The ‘convergence technologies’ that greatly improve access to information also afford ‘technological 
means of inhibiting access in ways that were never before practical’.” “The end result has been the 
collapse of the established lines of demarcation between public and private interests that were codified 
in the classical patent and copyright paradigms, and the enclosure and transformation of ‘larger and 
larger portions of the public data ‘commons’ . . . into private monopolies.’”) 
12 For example, see Sell, Susan K. Quest for Global Governance in Intellectual Property and Public 
Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, The. Temp. L. Rev. 77 (2004): 363. 
13 For example, see Merges, Robert P. Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System 
and Controversial Technologies. Md. L. Rev. 47 (1987): 1051. 
14 See Biber-Klemm, Susette, and Thomas Cottier. Rights to Plant Genetic Resources and Traditional 
Knowledge: Basic Issues and Perspectives. Oxfordshire: CABI Pub, 2006. 
15 See Sinjela, Mpazi. Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights: Tensions and Convergences. 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007. 
16 See Burleson, Elizabeth. Energy Policy, Intellectual Property, and Technology Transfer to Address 
Climate Change. Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 18 (2009): 69. 
17 For example, see Keith Maskus. Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economics of 
Intellectual Property in the 21st Century. Washington: Peterson Institute, 2012. Also see Madhavi 
Sunder. From Goods to a Good Life: Intellectual Property and Global Justice. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2012. 
18 See Prost, Mario. The Concept of Unity in Public International Law. Oxford, U.K.: Hart Pub, 2012, 
p 209. 
19 Dupuy, Pierre-Marie. Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and 
the International Court of Justice. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 31 (1998): 791. 
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international law-making of international regimes.20 And there are several angles 
demonstrating the importance and necessity of this study on institutional aspect, as 
follows. Firstly, from the perspective of normative fragmentation of international IP 
law or international law, academics tend to pay much more attentions to superficial 
phenomena, like how to determine the applicable law, how to solve those specific 
international problems, how is the role and efficacy of Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT) under new contexts with new requirements and momentum. 
Those concerns are indeed fine and fair, since 21st-century international law turns to 
be more specific-problem-oriented than before and those issues are directly and 
closely narrative and descriptive of international legal practices. But there are so 
many abstract perceptions and theoretical inspirations that scholars sometimes 
spontaneously ignore or just get distracted about things “behind the scenes” and deep 
big-picture settings,21 and subsequently get themselves constrained in the traditional 
conceptual framework.22 Meanwhile, the actual evolution of international law has 
already went far ahead,23 leaving the scholarship with no accurate grasp of the pulse 
of international (IP) law’s progress and with a lack of comprehensive understanding 
of how the global development of international institutions reflect the changing 
structure of international society and international (IP) law. 24  In contrast, the 
institutional aspect could provide researchers with incisive intelligence and accurate 
comprehending down deep into those waves and combustions in international law 
under a world society, and this study on the institutional aspect would definitely try to 
avoid those risks mentioned above. For example, what does give rise to the 
substantive question (the splitting up of the law into highly specialized “boxes”)? 
Certainly, it is the institutional aspect as different regimes have their own legitimate 
ability and political interests to develop international law.25 How to understand and 
                                                          
20 Fragmentation is an institutional expression of political pluralism internationally. See Koskenniemi, 
Martti, and Päivi Leino. Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties. Leiden Journal of 
International Law 15.03 (2002): 553-579. Also see ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion International Law. Report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 
(13 April 2006), p 13, par. 13. (“The previous paragraph raises both institutional and substantive 
problems. The former have to do with the competence of various institutions applying international 
legal rules and their hierarchical relations inter se.”) 
21 For example, Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. Regime-collisions: the Vain Search 
for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law. Mich. J. Int'l L. 25 (2003): 999, 1002-1003. 
(“They locate the cause for fragmentation not within the lack of jurisdictional hierarchy, but see norm 
collisions educing from the underlying conflicts between the ‘policies’ pursued by different 
international organizations and regulatory regimes. In this political perspective, collisions between 
legal norms are merely a mirror of the strategies followed by new collective actors within international 
relations, who pursue power-driven “special interests” without reference to a common interest and give 
rise to drastic ‘policy conflicts.’”) 
22 Such as in the VCLT where states are still the dominant actor on the top. Theoretical traditions are 
never self-evident, especially when they are confronted with new situations. 
23  Zumbansen, Peer. Transnational Law, Evolving. In Smits, J. M. Elgar, Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law. Cheltenham, U.K. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, p 900. 
24 Maybe it’s perceived as a new way or a upgraded perspective to understand the underlying law of 
international regimes’ and international law’s evolutionary and operational road. But all those 
rhetorical variations can still reflect that changes or transformations are happening progressively and 
accumulatively. 
25 See Wouters, Jan, and Bart De Meester. The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity and WTO 
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interpret the function of formal unity in consideration of both theoretical construction 
and practical fact-situations,26 in a complex society if fragmentation is just a kind of 
natural development?27 Explorations from the perspective of the economic analysis 
of institutions would be really helpful to support the realistic interests of international 
regimes rather than utopian assumptions. Secondly, under the backdrop and context of 
the “law and globalization” and the “world society”, the socio-legal study on the 
fragmentation of international (IP) law is such a productive and serviceable method 
that it cannot be overlooked, neither by “omission and a narrowing of one’s gaze”28 
or by any other accidents or preferences. And hence institutional perspective of the 
fragmentation of international (IP) law is the right lens to be reckoned with, 
containing many useful perspectives to be developed by international socio-legal 
research, while at the meantime the ICL’s normative aspect tends to have less and 
more limited relevance to regimes’ interactions.29 And thirdly, institutional aspect of 
the fragmentation phenomenon is set aside by the ICL because it is an “extremely 
complex issue”,30 and other scholars tend to avoid this portion as well. And as for 
international IP law, compared with normative conflicts among various regimes, it is 
still untouched and ill-defined about how to understand the institutional landscape of 
international IP law, which could be one of this paper’s potential academic 
contributions. Besides, this institutional fragmentation perspective enables the use of 
historical analysis of those international regimes and their interrelation/interaction,31 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Law: A Case Study in Fragmentation of International Law. Journal of World Trade 42.1 (2008): 205, 
239. (“Even though legal principles and conflict clauses may help to solve these tensions, they will 
never provide a full solution to this, in essence political, process of balancing values and interests.”) 
Also see Van Asselt, Harro. Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental Law: Forests 
at the Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 44 (2011): 1205, 
1211-1212. (“[T]he usefulness of legal techniques for resolving potential conflicts between the two 
legal regimes is constrained because of specific characteristics of international environmental law, 
namely the overlap in objectives and the important role of treaty body decisions in international 
environmental lawmaking.”) 
26 See Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, and Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Toward a New Legal Common 
Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation. London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002, p 99-162. Also 
see ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 
finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 15, par. 16. (“In 
conditions of social complexity, it is pointless to insist on formal unity. A law that would fail to 
articulate the experienced differences between fact-situations or between the interests or values that 
appear relevant in particular problem-areas would seem altogether unacceptable, utopian and 
authoritarian simultaneously.”) 
27 See Wight, Martin, Gabriele Wight, and Brian Porter. International Theory: The Three Traditions. 
Leicester: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991, p 139. (“The 
smaller the numerical membership of a society, and the more various its members, the more difficult it 
is to make rules not unjust to extreme cases: this is one reason for the weakness of international law.”) 
Also see Cassese, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 72.  
28  Zumbansen, Peer. Transnational Law, Evolving. In Smits, J. M. Elgar, Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law. Cheltenham, U.K. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, p 899. 
29 See Van Asselt, Harro. Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental Law: Forests at 
the Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 44 (2011): 1205, 1274. 
30 Christian Leathley, An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: 
Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity? (2007) 40 Intl L & Politics, 261. 
31 Here it is not argued specifically that the previous institutional things are the precursors of the 
institutional landscape as it stands now, but that it is more evident to investigate and define the 
institutional lineage in considerations of institutional inertia and path dependence. And this paper 
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which makes the argumentation and reasoning herein more persuasive and 
methodologically comprehensive. 
 
One interesting and hidden fact is that when the 2006 ILC Report quoted Wilfred 
Jenks, the report just selectively or incidentally didn’t mention anything about the 
institutional fragmentation part, while actually in Wilfred Jenks’s paper, this 
institutional aspect had been expounded from many angles.32 So, investigations on 
this institutional fragmentation are “not only desirable but necessary”33, more than 
any time before and more than the normative aspect of the fragmentation of 
international law. 
 
When it comes to the methods of this topic, interdisciplinary researches, including 
sociological study, economic analysis34 and anthropological research of international 
IP law, have good potentials and self-evident value. Economists and sociologists have 
done many researches on how the capitalism reshapes the geographical conception 
and global structure, such as the global city theory. Also, jurisprudence has similar 
theories (global law, international social evolution theory). But it is still uncultivated 
land about how international IP treaties interact within some regional areas with 
unique elements (like EU and Pacific Rim), how international IP treaties reorganize 
the connections among people within boundaries from the perspective of state and 
personhood, in terms of intellectual property protection. Because of the ceasing to 
existence of the “border” concept as well as gradual embedment of international IP 
law into national spheres, the territoriality of IP law is ever dissipating. The traditional 
Westphalia sovereignty state system with “defined physical territories” of states, 
exclusive and isolated, can no longer be appropriate in the era of globalization.35 
Thus international IP law requires more in-depth empirical research among multiple 
jurisdictions. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
agrees that lines of evolution for international legal rules are not that easy and distinct to track. See 
Craven, Matthew C. R., M. Fitzmaurice, and Maria Vogiatzi. Time, History and International Law. 
Leiden: M. Nijhoff, 2007, p 27-42. Also see Fassbender, Bardo, Anne Peters, Simone Peter, and Daniel 
Högger. The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law. 2012, p 16. 
32 For example, “In the absence of a world legislature with a general mandate, law-making treaties are 
tending to develop in a number of historical, functional and regional groups which are separate from 
each other and whose mutual relationships are in some respects analogous to those of separate systems 
of municipal law. These instruments inevitably react upon each other and their co-existence 
accordingly gives rise to problems which can be conveniently described, on the analogy of the conflict 
of laws, as the conflict of law-making treaties. This situation is in part a reflection of the present 
structure of international organization.” C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-making Treaties, 30 
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 1953, 403. 
33 See C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-making Treaties, 30 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 1953, 407. 
34 For the Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, see Langford, Jock. Intellectual Property Rights: 
Technology Transfer and Resource Implications. American Journal of Agricultural Economics (1997): 
1576-1583; (specifically in the agricultural sector)  
35 See Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White. The Future of International Law Is Domestic 
(or, The European Way of Law). 47 Harvard J Int'l L (2006), 327-352. This era has been seeing the 
rapid development and popularization of Internet, mobile communications technology and extensive 
application of the international aviation in transportation, and all those make the concept of “border” in 
traditional international law cease to exist. International law evolves into an era of making legal rules 
by different authoritative institutions and individuals. Also see Beck, Ulrich. Power in the Global Age: 
A New Global Political Economy. Cambridge: Polity, 2005, p xi.  
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Thus, this paper tries to use this theme as an entry point for reflective deconstruction 
and reconstruction of the international law-making in the field of international IP law, 
with helpful methodological devices and methods, and explore some descriptively and 
analytically effective perspectives and concepts in terms of logical and innovative 
correlations within the existing theories of legal studies in international IP law 
specifically including socio-legal study of international IP law, aiming at signaling 
core issues for further research agenda. And the analysis of the fragmentation of 
international IP law rests on several key concepts, including authority and legitimacy, 
regime interaction and institutional development. 
 
II. The Institutional Fragmentation of International IP Law 
 
Generally, in the language of the institutional fragmentation of international IP law, 
there are only some limited investigations in certain related topics: the emergence of a 
transnational trademark regime (trademark cosmopolitanism);36 the fragmentation of 
policy making and the proliferation of bilateral TRIPS-plus agreements;37 the role of 
TRIPs in global IP order,38 global governance of international IP protection between 
WTO TRIPs Agreement and WIPO;39 interface between TRIPs and CBD about 
biodiversity and sustainable development,40 and also some general legal analysis of 
existing global IP structure and regimes.41 And regime shifting is also a heated topic 
in international IP legal order.42 Academic writings on one specific international 
treaty, such as Berne Convention,43 CBD,44 WIPO Treaties,45 Trips,46 2012 Beijing 
                                                          
36 Katyal, Sonia. Trademark Cosmopolitanism. 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 875. 
37 El-said, Mohammed. The Compatibility of Modern Intellectual Property Protection Norms with 
Islamic Principles: Lessons from History. W.I.P.O.J. 2012, 4(1), 121-128. 
38 Grosse Ruse-Khan, H. The Role of TRIPS in a Fragmented IP World. IIC 2012, 43(8), 881-884. 
39 Thomas Cottier and Marina Foltea. Global Governance in Intellectual Property Protection: Does the 
Decision-making Forum. Matter? W.I.P.O.J. 2012, 3(2), 139-165. (Authors investigate whether there is 
any discrepancy in the balance of rights and obligations within multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral IP 
norm-making avenues, and argue that this balance is better secured under TRIPS Agreement and other 
multilateral forum, particularly WIPO, and propose greater judicial openness towards the developments 
in WTO.) 
40 Lekha Laxman, Abdul Haseeb Ansari. The Interface between TRIPS and CBD: Efforts towards 
Harmonization. J.I.T.L. & P. 2012, 11(2), 108-132. 
41 Oguamanam, Chidi. Intellectual Property in Global Governance: A Development Question. Milton 
Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012. Peter K. Yu. The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its 
Undetermined Future. W.I.P.O.J. 2009, 1(1), 1-15. 
42  See Helfer, Laurence R. Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking. Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, 2004, 1. 
43 Seville, Catherine. The internationalization of copyright law: books, buccaneers and the black flag 
in the nineteenth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. (It explores the history of 
international copyright law in the 19th century, and how this history can be relevant to today’s 
cyberspace as empirical evidence when we consider the reform of modern copyright law. The author 
believes that copyright law has been robust and flexible over several centuries, and it can surely create 
new balances and continue its legacy, as many of these “new” challenges we encountered now are 
simply fresh presentations of familiar historical dilemmas.) 
44 Curci, Jonathan. The Protection of Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge in International Law of 
Intellectual Property. Cambridge [U.K.]: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Aravind Kumar, and 
Govind Das. Biodiversity to Biotechnology: Intellectual Property Rights. New Delhi: Narosa Pub. 
House, 2010. 
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Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, 47  are abundant. And some articles are 
specifically focused on the tracing of principles in several follow-up treaties in 
copyright law, 48  or the historical reviews and comparative studies about the 
technological developments and the evolution of those international treaties have 
already been advanced comprehensively, especially under the big picture of the 
globalization of international IP law and the emergence of international IP regimes.49 
Moreover, specific treatises and monographs in some core and inclusive topics, like 
WIPO Development Agenda50, EU regional intellectual property law,51 South-North 
balance of rights and obligations in international IP system, 52  trade and 
environment 53  as well as the protection of traditional knowledge, 54  are also 
ubiquitous. But, as for the highly complex and rapidly evolving of the international IP 
law regimes, potential issues on the fragmentation of international IP law, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
45 Reinbothe, Jörg, and Silke von Lewinski. The WIPO Treaties 1996: The WIPO Copyright Treaty 
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty: Commentary and Legal Analysis. London: 
Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002. 
46 For example, Matthews, Duncan. Globalising intellectual property rights: the TRIPS Agreement. 
London: Routledge, 2013. Sell, Susan K. Private power, public law: The globalization of intellectual 
property rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Drahos, Peter, and John Braithwaite. 
Intellectual Property, Corporate Strategy, Globalisation: TRIPS in Context. Wis. Int’l LJ 20 (2001): 
451. 
47 Adebambo Adewopo. WIPO’s New Treaty and “New” Copyright for Audio-visual Performers? A 
Pan-African Perspective. W.I.P.O.J. 2013, 4(2), 206-219. 
48 Catherine Seville. The Principles of International Intellectual Property Protection: from Paris to 
Marrakesh. W.I.P.O.J. 2013, 5(1), 95-104. Ulrich Loewenheim. The Principle of National Treatment in 
the International Conventions Protecting Intellectual Property. In Waldeck und Pyrmont, Wolrad, and 
Joseph Straus. Patents and Technological Progress in a Globalized World Liber Amicorum Joseph 
Straus. Berlin: Springer, 2009, pp 593-599. 
49 For example, Maugham, Robert. A Treatise on the Laws of Literary Property Comprising the 
Statutes and Cases Relating to Books, Manuscripts, Lectures, Dramatic and Musical Compositions, 
Engravings, Sculpture, Maps, &C. : Including the Piracy and Transfer of Copyright, with a Historical 
View, and Disquisitions on the Principles and Effects of the Laws. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, 
Brown, and Green, 1828.  
50 De Beer, Jeremy and Bannerman, Sara. Foresight into the Future of WIPO’s Development Agenda. 
World Intellectual Property Organization Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2010, pp. 211-231. Netanel, Neil. The 
Development Agenda: Global Intellectual Property and Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009. May, Christopher. The World Intellectual Property Organization: Resurgence 
and the Development Agenda. London: Routledge, 2007. Edge Network Workshop on “Strategies to 
Implement the WIPO Development Agenda”. Edge Network Workshop on “Strategies to Implement 
the WIPO Development Agenda”: 16-17-18 March, 2008, at the University of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: 
University of Hong Kong, 2008. 
51 Seville, Catherine. EU Intellectual Property Law and Policy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2009. Cook, Trevor M. EU Intellectual Property Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010. Cottier, Thomas, and Pierre Véron. Concise International and European IP Law: Trips, Paris 
Convention, European Enforcement and Transfer of Technology. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2008. (Also have some parts on TRIPs and Pairs Convention.) Kamina, Pascal. Film 
copyright in the European Union. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
52 See Ruth L. Okediji. The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public 
Interest Considerations for Developing Countries. UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development, 2006. 
53 Kevin P. Gallagher, Handbook on Trade and the Environment. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2008. 
54 Oguamanam, Chidi. International Law and Indigenous Knowledge: Intellectual Property, Plant 
Biodiversity, and Traditional Medicine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006. Antons, Christoph. 
Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions, and Intellectual Property Law in the 
Asia-Pacific Region. Alphen Aan Den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009. 
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operational logic and developmental mode of international IP regimes, etc., insights 
always await to be mined. 
 
Those researches are valuable and fulfilling both in details and in general. But 
academic issues, including what about the holistic examination of the structure and 
landscape of institutional fragmentation of international IP law (especially from the 
perspective of historical evolution, background-driven transformation 55  and 
contemporary contradictions)56, how to understand the practical interaction and 
interrelationships of those correlative actors (such as, most importantly, the dynamic 
interaction of WIPO and WTO TRIPs Agreement), what are the underlying 
implications from this institutional fragmentation of international IP law for future 
international IP regulation, are rarely elaborated through empirical observation and 
investigation with accounts of the virtues of the international law-making process, the 
ontological operating logic of international law and the contemporary evolutionary 
momentum of international IP law. This absent of systematic assessment and 
reconstruction of the international IP law is a big flaw and also a huge concern, as 
scholars and international practitioners are still “navigating the uncharted waters” of 
international IP law,57 meanwhile complaining that international intellectual property 
legal rules have evolved in a much more haphazard way or have gone too far from 
primary objectives.58 
 
Therefore, through this “institutional” approach, “intellectual property” approach, and 
altogether “institutional fragmentation of international IP law” approach, this 
remarkable study could be highly expected to provide some interpretations on the 
institutional fragmentation of international (IP) law on account of international IP 
law’s spectacularly rapid developments and inherent attributes in this time of flux 
under world society,59 where new sub-state/non-state actors pouring into from the 
                                                          
55 For example, according to Arnold Duncan McNair, said in 1962, “the feature of the past half century 
has been the gradual transformation of international law from a book-law occasionally supplemented 
by treaties into a case-law constantly supplemented by treaties”. See McNair, Arnold Duncan McNair. 
The Expansion of International Law. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1962, p 54. 
56 How to deal with “the creation, development and clarification of an imposing body of rules of 
international law of varying degrees of crystallization”? See Lauterpacht, Hersch. The Development of 
International Law by the International Court. London: Stevens, 1958. 
57 Adebambo Adewopo, WIPO’s New Treaty and “New” Copyright for Audio-visual Performers? A 
Pan-African Perspective, W.I.P.O.J. 2013, 4(2), 206-219. 
58 See Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2006, pp.115–
116. Also see Drahos, Peter. The Global Governance of Knowledge: Patent Offices and Their Clients. 
Cambridge [U.K.]: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
59  Thomas Cottier and Marina Foltea. Global Governance in Intellectual Property Protection: Does 
the Decision-making Forum. Matter? W.I.P.O.J. 2012, 3(2), 141. (“IP protection in international law is 
perhaps the area of law which is most advanced in terms of international standards and norms 
prescribing the conduct of governments—and often indirectly, of private actors.”) See F.M. Abbott, T. 
Cottier and F. Gurry. International Intellectual Property in an Integrated World Economy. Austin: 
Aspen Publishers, 2011. (“There is hardly any other field in international economic law where rules on 
substantive and procedural standards offer a more comprehensive and common set.”) See Peter K. Yu. 
The Global Intellectual Property Order and its Undetermined Future. W.I.P.O.J. 2009, 1(1), 1. (“The 
rapid evolution of digital technologies and the arrival of the internet, new business models and open 
access arrangements have upset the dynamics within existing intellectual property industries.”) Ruth L. 
Okediji. The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public Interest 
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bottom.60 Against the historical background of traditional international legal order 
built upon the Westphalia system, that topic has also been a virgin land particularly 
calling for more pervasive and holistic studies with innovative research methods, 
perspectives and concepts.61 Thus, this paper exerts itself to advance the study of the 
basic landscape of international IP law, its institutional fragmentation and future 
development, therein critically reconciling and reconstructing those prevailing 
interpretations and understandings in regards to both the institutional fragmentation of 
international IP law and closely-related sub-issues (legality and legitimacy of 
international IP regimes and authorities, the international IP law-making process, and 
further development of international IP law), as well as taking other in-depth 
researches focusing on specific international legal regimes into consideration. 
 
III. International IP Regimes in Pacific Rim:  
Under the Context of Institutional Fragmentation 
 
Despite that there are so many different regional and international regimes, 
institutions, mechanisms and other forum in Pacific Rim that are substantially linked 
with the international or transnational cooperation of regulating the intellectual 
property legal affairs, this paper will primarily focus on the following ones: WIPO, 
TRIPs, CBD, TPP, RECP, FTAAP. That’s because firstly those regimes are the main 
international regimes related to the IP field contemporarily, and secondly those 
international actors has been interacting frequently and closely on many important 
intellectual property issues in the lase decades. Thirdly, as far as the author is 
concerned, those international institutions will continue or begin to dominate the 
future international IP law-making and landscape reconstruction, in spite of different 
initiator States, emphases and fundamental goals. And also, the analysis of authority 
and legitimacy, as well as regime interaction, will accordingly be focused on those 
regimes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Considerations for Developing Countries. UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development, 2006, vii. (“Patents, copyrights, trademarks, utility models, industrial designs, integrated 
circuits and geographical indications are frequently mentioned in discussions and debates on such 
diverse topics as public health, food security, education, trade, industrial policy, traditional knowledge, 
biodiversity, biotechnology, the Internet, the entertainment and media industries. In a knowledge-based 
economy, there is no doubt that a better understanding of IPRs is indispensable to informed policy 
making in all areas of human development.”) 
60 Gustaaf Geeraerts. Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics. Pole Paper Series, Vol. 1, No. 4, 
October 1995. Virginia Haufler. Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: International 
Regimes and Non-State Actors, in Rittberger, Volker, and Peter Mayer, eds. Regime Theory and 
International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 94-111. Bianchi, Andrea. Non-State Actors 
and International Law. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate Pub. Co, 2009. (Discussions on the 
emergence of non-state actors and its potential role under the changing international legal framework in 
the globalization of various issues, including environmental protection, human rights, armed conflicts 
and the reconceptualization of international civil society.) Carty, Anthony. Philosophy of International 
Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007, 79-109. Cassese, Antonio. International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 3-6, 124-139. 
61 For example, “A more intriguing question is whether to conceive relationships between state and 
individual as being vertical (sovereign and subject) or horizontal (equal subjects) in kind.” See Ole 
Spiermann. Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law. EJIL (2007), Vol. 18 No. 5, 813. 
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1. Global IP Regimes in Pacific Rim 
 
A. WIPO 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a self-funding global IP 
regime of the United Nations,62 established in 1967 by the Convention Establishing 
the World Intellectual Property Organization. The United International Bureaux for 
the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI), an International Bureau founded in 
1893 for the administration of the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention, was 
the predecessor of WIPO. It is missioned for “the development of a balanced and 
effective international intellectual property (IP) system that enables innovation and 
creativity for the benefit of all”, 63  by promoting the efficient protection and 
harmonizing national legislations, performing the administrative tasks of the Unions, 
agreeing to assume (or participate in) the administration of any other international 
agreement and encouraging the conclusion of international agreements, etc.64 And as 
for its functions and authority, WIPO has defined“intellectual property” with a really 
large scope and broad spectrum, from literary and artistic works to performances, 
from industrial designs and integrated circuits to inventions, from trademarks, 
geographical indications to unfair competition, etc.65 Also, WIPO has been equally 
open to almost all countries in the world,66 committing itself to contribute to better 
understanding and cooperation among States and Desiring to modernize and render 
more efficient the administration of the Unions.67 Up to 2014, WIPO already have 
187 member states. More importantly, WIPO particularly welcomes the inclusion of 
stakeholders (intergovernmental/nongovernmental organizations, interest groups and 
civil society) as observers at the formal meetings of member states, like EPO, UPOV, 
ASEAN, EU, WTO, FAO, WHO.68 
 
                                                          
62  See Article 1, Agreement between the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (entered into effect on December 17, 1974). 
63 See WIPO Official Website. Available at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/index.html. Also see 
Article 3, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (Signed at Stockholm 
on July 14, 1967 and 
as amended on September 28, 1979), which writes that: “The objectives of the Organization are: (i) to 
promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among States 
and, where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international organization, (ii) to ensure 
administrative cooperation among the Unions.” 
64 Article 4, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. 
65 Article 2 (viii), Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Also see 
WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use, WIPO Publication, No. 489 (E), Chapter 
2 - Fields of IP Protection. Available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/intproperty/489/wipo_pub_489.pdf. 
66 Article 5, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Article 5 provides 
that membership is open to any state that is: (1) a member of the Paris Union for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, or member of the Berne Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; or 
(2) (i) a member of the United Nations, or of any of the United Nations’ Specialized Agencies, or of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, or that is a party to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice; or (ii) invited by the WIPO General Assembly to become a member state of the Organization. 
67 See the Preamble, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. 
68 See WIPO, BIG/158/26, ANNEX II. Intergovernmental Organizations Admitted as Observers to the 
Meetings of the Assemblies of the Member States. Available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/members/en/docs/observers.pdf. 
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Right now, WIPO is mainly composed of the following global protection system: 
International Patent System, 69  the International Trademark System, 70  the 
International Design System,71 the International System of Appellations of Origin,72 
and the International Copyright System,73 etc.74 And those global legal protection 
networks and regimes are increasingly growing both stronger and broader, 
geographically and substantively.75 It is no exaggeration to say that WIPO is a quite 
effective and well-governed authority with comparatively sufficient political 
legitimacy in international IP law.   
 
Regarding its relations with other international IP organizations, apart from the basic 
rule of coordination, cooperation and consultation agreements/arrangements made by 
the Director General after approved by the Coordination Committee controlled by the 
                                                          
69 It includes: (1) Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), Done at Washington on June 19, 1970, amended 
on September 28, 1979, modified on February 3, 1984, and on October 3, 2001 (as in force from April 
1, 2002); (2) Regulations under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (as in force from July 1, 2014); (3) PCT 
Administrative Instructions (as in force from September 16, 2012). 
70 It consists of (1) Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks; (2) 
Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks; (3) 
Common Regulations under the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks 
and the Protocol Relating to that Agreement (in force on January 1, 2013); (4) Administrative 
Instructions for the Application of the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of 
Marks and the Protocol Relating Thereto (in force as of January 1, 2008). 
71 It refers to (1) The Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs 
(London Act of June 2, 1934; Hague Act of November 28, 1960; Geneva Act of July 2, 1999); (2) 
Common Regulations Under the 1999 Act and the 1960 Act of the Hague Agreement (as in force on 
January 1, 2014); (3) Administrative Instructions for the Application of the Hague Agreement (as in 
force on January 1, 2014). 
72 It is formed from (1) Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their 
International Registration (as amended on September 28, 1979); (2) Regulations Under the Lisbon 
Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International Registration (as in force 
on January 1, 2012); (3) Administrative Instructions for the application of the Lisbon Agreement (as in 
force on January 1, 2010). 
73 It is constitutive of (1) Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as 
amended on September 28, 1979); (2) Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms 
Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms (of October 29, 1971); (3) International 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organizations (Done at Rome on October 26, 1961); (4) WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) (adopted in 
Geneva on December 20, 1996), WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (adopted in 
Geneva on December 20, 1996); (5) Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (adopted by the 
Diplomatic Conference on the Protection of Audiovisual Performances in Beijing, on June 24, 2012). 
74 For a complete list of the 26 treaties administered by WIPO and other systems as well as 
classifications, please see WIPO-Administered Treaties. Available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/. 
Also see WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use, WIPO Publication, No. 489 (E), 
Chapter 5 - International Treaties and Conventions on Intellectual Property. Available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/intproperty/489/wipo_pub_489.pdf. 
75 For example, Canada’s ratification of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty on May 13, 2014; Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Industrial Designs |Accession by the Republic of Korea (No 121). Also, 
substantive laws are also boosting, like the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (adopted by 
the Diplomatic Conference on the Protection of Audiovisual Performances in Beijing, on June 24, 
2012), Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually 
Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled (adopted by the Diplomatic Conference to Conclude a Treaty to 
Facilitate Access to Published Works by Visually Impaired Persons and Persons with Print Disabilities 
on June 27, 2013). 
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states parties, 76  WIPO also encourages the conclusion and participates in the 
administration of international IP agreements when it is necessary and appropriate.77 
However, specifically about the relationship between WIPO and TRIPs, despite the 
entering into a cooperation agreement with the WTO,78 that agreement narrowly 
provided rules about the mutual accessibility of laws and information-sharing, 
implementation of Article 6ter of the Paris Convention, and technical assistance and 
cooperation. Nothing is explicitly assured about how to deal with potential and 
emerging conflicts of rules, as well as competing and overlapping jurisdictions and 
competences. Regime interaction between WIPO and TRIPs seems to constantly 
influence the legitimacy of them as authorities, with different internal operation, 
evolution strategies and self-positioning. 
 
B. WTO TRIPs Agreement 
The Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs 
Agreement) is the most comprehensive multilateral IP treaty negotiated in the 
1986-94 Uruguay Round under the framework of WTO, covering copyright and 
related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, 
integrated circuits, and undisclosed information. It introduced intellectual property 
into the multilateral trading system for the first time, with minimum standards of 
substantive protection incorporating treaties previously administered under WIPO by 
reference,79 enforcement of intellectual property rights, and WTO dispute settlement 
procedures.80 USA and EU dominated this “common ground-rules” model, with basic 
principles and detailed harmonizing rules, 81  for higher intellectual property 
protections through this linking IP with international trade law in a package. Thus, the 
Trips Agreement was born with dual character: built upon established heritage of 
international IP law and international trade law.82  
 
U.S. was frustrated that WIPO was paying too much attention to developing countries 
and that WIPO had no enforcement mechanisms. With WIPO’s one-state, one-vote 
rule, U.S. was less able to exert leverage to achieve its desired policies.83 So, here 
                                                          
76 Article 13, 8, 3, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Also see 
Article 2, Agreement between the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(entered into effect on December 17, 1974). 
77 Article 4, (iii), (iv), Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. 
78 Agreement between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization 
(December 22, 1995). 
79 Article 2, 9, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
80 For details of the TRIPs agreement, please see Overview: the TRIPS Agreement. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm. Also see Correa, Carlos María. Research 
Handbook on the Interpretation and Enforcement of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2010. 
81 National Treatment, MFN, and Balanced Protection. See Understanding the WTO: the Agreements - 
Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm. 
82 See Taubman, Antony, Hannu Wager, and Jayashree Watal, eds. A handbook on the WTO TRIPS 
agreement. Cambridge University Press, 2012, p xx. 
83 Sell, Susan K. TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP. J. 
Intell. Prop. L. 18 (2010): 447-478, 450. 
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comes the WTO TRIPs Agreement. After the TRIPs Agreement came into effect, 
WTO members, quite a few non-governmental international organizations, academia 
and the media have expressed many concerns about the damage caused by such a high 
standard of intellectual property protection to the resolving of other tightly associated 
issues, such as public health, environmental protection, human rights and also the 
protection of traditional knowledge. The external consequences of the TRIPs 
Agreement are to protect the economic interests of developed countries one-sidedly,84 
while the basic human rights of people in developing countries (especially LDCs) are 
threated. This reality and an overwhelming wave of oppositions could not be 
alleviated in the traditional WTO bureaucrats and relatively closed system, and then 
expanded into a denunciation of the democratic deficits of the TRIPs agreement and 
even WTO. Their legality and legitimacy are inescapably seriously challenged. All 
this forced the WTO General Council to make responses and reformations in 2001 on 
one of the most sensitive and also the most important core issues: public health. The 
adaptation of the “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health”85 marks 
that the WTO, this stiff international trading system, was finally activated from such a 
long deep sleep and began to address the shortcomings of its own in the settling of 
great international concerns under a new era, and also indicates that “WTO 
Development Agenda”86 has become gradually deepened.87 However, it should be 
clearly noted that this declaration is not the end of the criticisms and doubts, nor does 
developed economies’ attempts to extending this “higher level of protection” to other 
subfields of IP.88 
                                                          
84 Actually, not only the existing provisions of the TRIPs Agreement, but also the future amendments 
to it will also be dominated by main powers (EU and USA) moving forward in the direction of simply 
higher protection of IP rather than balanced arrangements linking IP with other important and 
inseparable topics. For example, the extension of the protection of geographical indications and the 
requirement to disclose the country of origin of genetic resources and traditional knowledge used in the 
inventions are two intensely debated issues in 2013 and2014, but they are treated in a totally different 
way by developed countries. See WTO General Council - Trade Negotiations Committee - Council for 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights - Special Session, Geographical Indications 
(Communication from the European Communities), WT/GC/W/547, 14 June 2005. Available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/tn/ip/W11.doc. Also see WTO General 
Council - Trade Negotiations Committee, Issues Related to the Extension of the Protection of 
Geographical Indications Provided for in Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to Products Other Than 
Wines and Spirits and Those Related to the Relationship Between The TRIPs Agreement and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (Report by the Director-General), WT/GC/W/591, TN/C/W/50, 9 
June 2008. Available at http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/tn/c/W50.doc. 
85 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, adopted on 14 November 2001. 
86 The Round was officially launched at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in 
November 2001. The Doha Ministerial Declaration provided the mandate for the negotiations, 
including on agriculture, services and an intellectual property topic, which began earlier. 
87 For the Doha agenda, this separate declaration sets two specific tasks. The TRIPS Council has to 
find a solution to the problems countries may face in making use of compulsory licensing if they have 
too little or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, reporting to the General Council on this by the 
end of 2002. (This was achieved in August, 2003, see intellectual property section of the “Agreements” 
chapter.) The declaration also extends the deadline for least-developed countries to apply provisions on 
pharmaceutical patents until 1 January 2016. See The Doha Declaration explained. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm. 
88 For example, they have been trying to win in the debate of whether relevant provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement (mainly Article 23) provide a mandate for extending coverage beyond wines and spirits. 
See WTO Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft Decision to Amend Section 3 of Part II of the TRIPs 
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Institutional contexts and historical backgrounds are always important to understand 
the underlying motivation and necessity for establishing a new international regime.89 
So, why TRIPs was highly pushed forward by developed countries? And why it 
seemed to be quite successful in its first decades but it cannot be progressively 
evolutionary now? Compared to WIPO, what are its advantages and disadvantages?90 
 
TRIPS Agreement certainly is not the end of the process of establishing an 
international intellectual property regime, but merely the beginning.91 The conclusion 
of TRIPS Agreement did, greatly and effectively, enhance the international protection 
of intellectual property rights, since it linked IP with international trade and reinforced 
that with powerful dispute settlement mechanism. Many countries had to amend their 
domestic laws substantively and accordingly to meet higher standards in TRIPs, 
indeed harmonizing the domestic IP legal rules fundamentally.92 This method of 
“linking” and “package deal” crushed down the obstacles and divergences in the 
decades’ negotiation, while the economic interests of developed countries were more 
emphasized and taken into account;93 and doubts has always been arguably going 
along with arise of disputes as well as resistance from time to time.94 
 
However, TRIPs later suffered from this method and backdrop with which it used to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Agreement, TN/C/W/60, 19 April 2011. 
89 See David, Paul A. Why are Institutions the ‘Carriers of History’?: Path Dependence and the 
Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 
5.2 (1994): 205-220. (“Three main analytical insights into the conditions that give rise to path 
dependence in economic phenomena generally can be applied to answer the question why history 
matters so vitally to the form and functioning of human organizations and institutions…”) 
90 This comparative perspective between TRIPs and WIPO seems to be the most classic means for the 
analysis of the international IP law-making. For example, see Netanel, Neil W. The Next Round: The 
Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement. Va. J. Int'l L. 37 (1996): 441. 
Helfer, Laurence R. Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking. Yale J. Int'l L. 29 (2004): 1. 
91 See Doane, Michael L. TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of 
Advancing Technology. Am. UJ Int'l L. & Pol'y 9 (1993): 465, 484. 
92 See Gin, Elaine B. International Copyright Law: Beyond the WIPO & (and) TRIPS Debate. J. Pat. 
& Trademark Off. Soc'y 86 (2004): 763. (“Although the jurisdiction of national laws stops at the 
borders, IP - because of its intangible nature - can easily cross borders and be freely infringed in other 
countries, whose laws may not protect IP. To remedy this, many countries (particularly the developed 
countries) seek strong protection of IP rights through international harmonization, which include 
standardization of national IP laws and enforcement procedures. But less developed countries have 
often resisted such harmonization efforts.”) 
93 See Adede, Adronico O. Origins and History of the TRIPS Negotiations. In Bellmann, Christophe, 
and Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, eds. Trading in Knowledge: Development Perspectives on TRIPS, Trade 
and Sustainability. Routledge, 2013, p 31. (“They realized that it would not be possible to have a 
successful outcome to the Uruguay Round without a viable TRIPs agreement being part of the package. 
In other words, both the developing and the developed countries saw the need to protect the integrity of 
the Uruguay Round of negotiations to produce its desired needs. This factor became evident to all the 
negotiations as early as 1989 during the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round.”) 
94 See Chin, Judith C., and Gene M. Grossman. Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade. 
NBER Working Paper w2769 (1991). (“We find that the interests of the North and the South generally 
conflict in the matter of protection of intellectual property, with the South benefiting from the ability to 
pirate technology and the North harmed by such actions. A strong system of intellectual property rights 
may or may not enhance world efficiency.”) 
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prosper smoothly.95 That’s because this method of “linking” and “package deal” 
forced forward with the interests and demands of developing countries ignored, 
forcing developing countries into a dilemma between costly compromise and 
complete failure, and cunningly pushing the responsibility of potential failure of the 
multilateral negotiation process onto developing countries.96  So far, the TRIPs 
Agreement was born to be like one-time consumption or one-shot deal, despite that it 
is already good enough for US, at least used to be a good bargain. What’s worse, due 
to the contrast between the enforceability of those specific high standards of IP 
protection in the developing countries’ side and the fuzziness of industrialized 
countries’ corresponding trade-off commitments in the developed countries’ side, 
those ever-increasingly inequality and unfairness make the multilateral approach for 
intellectual property protection under the WTO framework substantively lose most of 
mutual trust politically and balance of interests economically, which then gradually 
eroded this big construction and derogated its legality and legitimacy.97 In a sense, 
this is the natural malady and inevitable fate of the existing American-dominated 
mode and “trade-IP linking”98. 
 
From the perspective of cost-benefit analysis of international rule-making, this linking 
IP with international trade law and forcing forward to prioritizing the developed 
countries’ interests is America’s choice of last resort, given the reality of collective 
action dilemma of the multilateral approach. If US didn’t push all the way with this 
“all or nothing” strategy,99 the TRIPs Agreement would inevitably be stillborn, or at 
                                                          
95 For example, see Abbott, Frederick M. TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the 
Future of the TRIPs Agenda. Berkeley J. Int'l L. 18 (2000): 165-268, 268. (“But high standards of IPRs 
protection will not by themselves address the tremendous imbalance between the levels of 
technological development in the industrialized and developing economies. The WTO needs to begin 
to work more closely with the World Bank, UNCTAD, UNDP, WIPO, WHO and other multilateral 
institutions to create an environment that promotes the transfer of knowledge and technology in ways 
that are productive for both industrialized and developing countries.”) 
96 See Adede, Adronico O. Origins and History of the TRIPS Negotiations. In Bellmann, Christophe, 
and Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, eds. Trading in Knowledge: Development Perspectives on TRIPS, Trade 
and Sustainability. Routledge, 2013, p 29. (“The negotiating system has been criticized by the 
developing countries, claiming that it tends to place on the negotiating table, proposals and agreements 
which have been largely negotiated by the major players such as the US, the EU and Japan, for the 
endorsement by the rest of the membership of the WTO, who are thus excluded from the actual 
negotiation on the issues.”) 
97 See Bellmann, Christophe, and Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, eds. Trading in Knowledge: Development 
Perspectives on TRIPS, Trade and Sustainability. Routledge, 2013. (“An unprecedented surge in the 
scope and level of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection has been engulfing the world. This 
globalizing trend has shifted the balance of interests between private innovators and society at large 
and tensions have flared around key public policy concerns. As developing nations' policy options to 
use IPRs in support of their broader development strategy are being rapidly narrowed down, many 
experts are questioning the one-size-fits-all approach to IPR protection and are backing a rebalancing 
of the global regime.”) 
98 That’s because the topic of Trade and IP have quite different values as their central theoretical and 
practical philosophy. For example, see Geller, Paul Edward. Intellectual Property in the Global 
Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS Dispute Settlements?. The International Lawyer (1995): 99-115, 
114-115. (“TRIPS panels will be focused on trade, while intellectual property laws, though attuned to 
economic considerations, are motivated by other values as well.”) 
99 See Doane, Michael L. TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of 
Advancing Technology. Am. UJ Int'l L. & Pol'y 9 (1993): 465, 476. 
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least greatly weakened. But on the other hand, from the perspective of balanced 
protection principle and the interests of developing countries, the TRIPs Agreement 
was more than demanding and tendentious to them. And Western developed 
economies’ indefinite, non-binding and disproportionate commitments are far from 
tempting and satisfactory, compared to developing countries’ compromises. 
 
To sum up, the TRIPs Agreement was successfully arrived at because (1) the 
historical backgrounds (demands of global economic growth and integration, the 
feasibility of a multilateral framework) call for and allow the deepening of 
international trade liberalization, and all the countries hope that the success of the 
Uruguay Round of negotiations can bring about a new round of steady growth for the 
global economy, while the developing countries didn’t want to bear the infamy of 
hindering multilateral process and risk some of their trade-off benefits; (2) the 
strategy of introducing IP to international trade law, the “all or nothing” package deal, 
and the method of delinking IP from other associated issues (like human rights and 
environmental protection) is realistic, effective and rational; (3) US, along with its 
trade allies, still had the diplomatic capabilities, economic powers and international 
authoritative prestige to vigorously promote the signing of this “One-Size (‘Extra 
Large’) Fits All”100 package of agreements and dominate the moral high ground and 
core values. 
 
But after almost two decades, the TRIPs Agreement has lost its shiny halo now,101 
with both tides of criticism from emerging developing countries and America’s 
turning to other useful and promising new regimes.102 Actually, this is the normal 
logic and rational cycle of the development and proliferation of international IP 
regimes in a world society without overarching hierarchy, which incidentally and 
consequently leads to the so-called institutional fragmentation of international IP law. 
Every international IP regime has its own unique historical global backgrounds, 
special purposes for its creation and accordingly inherent lifecycle. In other words, its 
declining and getting abandoned is the natural evolution of the international legal 
system after the completion of its historic mission, and this is the “ethos” of 
international (IP) law-making.103 WIPO is a good precedent for TRIPs, since the 
United States intended to ratify the TRIPs Agreement since WIPO was not 
                                                          
100 Boyle, James. A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property. Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 
2004 (2004): 9-15. 
101 This “one size fits all” attitude has been widely condemned, in both the developed and developing 
world. See Boyle, James. A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property. Duke L. & 
Tech. Rev. 2004 (2004): 9-15. 
102 Such as ACTA, TPP, etc. See Sell, Susan K. TRIPS was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, 
FTAS, ACTA, and TPP. J. Intell. Prop. L. 18 (2010): 447. 
103 See Ole Spiermann. Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law. EJIL (2007), Vol. 18 No. 5, 
785−814. (Regarding this new understanding of the institutional fragmentation and the “ethos” of 
international law, Ole Spiermann contends that many international lawyers still persist in conceiving 
and judging international law against a background colored by national legal traditions, and they did 
not overcome the optimist and evolutionary tradition based on the assumption that international law is 
but an ever closer approximation of national legal systems.) For similar arguments about international 
lawyers’ understanding of 21st century international law, see Prost, Mario. The Concept of Unity in 
Public International Law. Oxford, U.K.: Hart Pub, 2012, p 191-192. 
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incompetent, based on the prevailing circumstances at that time. What’s more, WIPO 
is an excellent example of how an international IP regime can transfigure with glory 
and upgrade itself through accurate grasp and understanding of international 
intellectual property protection trends, 104  through analyzing the comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of those international IP regimes with forward-looking 
visions and cleverly compensating the drawbacks of existing IP regimes, 
notwithstanding that inherent ethos of the regime decide those outcomes to a great 
extent. Under the circumstance of little attentions and powerful connections for WIPO, 
it re-boards the main stage for international intellectual property regimes.105 WIPO 
always takes the multilateral-led and all members participatory mode with a certain 
degree of self-independence, and also doesn’t deliberately try to link IP with other 
issues, thus making it more efficient on the long run under the economic analysis 
regarding the international IP law-making, the balance of interests among different 
party members, and the legality and legitimacy of international IP legal rules. 
 
Then, is it possible for TRIPs to start a similar self-redemption and self-revolution? 
On all accounts, it doesn’t seem to be the correct prediction or solution for cognitive 
challenges of the present era to attempt to conduct a simple historical analogy. The 
practical and operational contexts of those institutions are entirely different, and 
accordingly it is quite different when concluding the future fate of TRIPs. But in 
reference to the characteristics of the WTO TRIPs Agreement itself and the bigger 
overall framework mechanism, it is argued here that it is difficult for TRIPs to 
achieve this reversal and revival. Firstly, in relation to the overall context, TRIPs 
incorporates the intellectual property topic into trade agreement under the WTO 
framework. This link inevitably leads to relatively small independence for TRIPs, and 
the need to update or upgrade it would be placed under the development of the overall 
trade framework, which makes it far from easy to reverse the existing paradigm.106 
Right now, multilateral free trade agreement negotiations and further development of 
WTO Trade Law has almost become a dead end, making it almost impossible to have 
an informed and democratic debate about the trajectory we are on. Secondly, in terms 
of this particular agreement under the WTO framework, the national trade interests 
within TRIPs agreement lead to largely restricted potentials for further upgrading of 
the mechanism, as developed and developing countries have big divergences 
                                                          
104 For example, see Ramcharan, Robin. International Intellectual Property Law and Human Security. 
TMC Asser Press, 2013, p 217-243. (“WIPO has recognized that the organization has a role to play in 
human security, specifically in enhancing the development of its Member States. Whereas it has 
traditionally seen its role as a technical-legal one to assist Member States to apply existing IP laws, 
WIPO has embraced a development-oriented agenda and work plan that recognize the human security 
concerns of the vast majority of its membership and the need for a more flexible and balanced IP 
regime.”) 
105 See Boyle, James. A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property. Duke L. & Tech. 
Rev. 2004 (2004): 9-15. (In this Manifesto, Professor Boyle claims that there are systematic errors in 
contemporary intellectual property policy and that WIPO has an important role in helping to correct 
them.) 
106 See Boyle, James. A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property. Duke L. & Tech. 
Rev. 2004 (2004): 9-15. (“Trade negotiations have become the preferred arena for expanding rights 
still further.”) 
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concerning enormous economic benefits on intellectual property topic, not to mention 
other difficulties to achieve the upgrading goal. Developed countries’ credit to 
achieve benefits exchange and win-win mechanism in multilateral negotiation and 
international IP law-making has went bankruptcy, and emerging powers’ ambitions to 
develop more fair and balanced International IP rules as well as bargaining 
mechanism have already been undoubtedly exposed. Under this context of chaotic 
regime competition and disordered international IP governance, 107  short-term 
development of international IP regimes would undergo an age of “Tale of Two 
Cities”, when it is “the best of times” with promising embraces and “the worst of 
times” with uncharted rocks.108 Thirdly, as for the specific enforcement mechanism 
of TRIPs agreement, the law-making practices of the Panel and Appellate Body can 
surely promote the rule to advance with the times and constantly absorb the dynamic 
changes of new landscape of interests and new demands of rule-making to some 
extent, but the limited impact of this case law cannot meet the requirements of the 
new texture and paradigm of international IP law-making in this time.109 
 
C. CBD 
CBD started primarily with several experts meeting organized by UNEP Governing 
Council, particularly the 14/26110 and 15/34111 decisions in late 1980s. It was found 
that existing international regimes were inadequate for the biodiversity protection 
against growing threats: the World Heritage Convention covered limited cultural and 
natural heritage sites;112 CITES only covered threats to endangered species;113 the 
                                                          
107 See Abbott, Frederick M. Distributed Governance at the WTO-WIPO: An Evolving Model for 
Open-Architecture Integrated Governance. Journal of International Economic Law 3.1 (2000): 63-81. 
(“The producer-driven governance model is not suited to the highly integrated international society of 
the 21st century. The WTO governance structure should be adapted to account for more diverse 
interests, including those of marginalized developing countries, NGOs, and individuals. One aspect of 
this adaptation should involve more highly integrated relations between the WTO and other 
multilateral institutions.”) 
108 Dickens, Charles, and Andrew Sanders. A Tale of Two Cities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1988, p 1. (“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age 
of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it 
was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything 
before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the 
other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities 
insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.”) 
109 See Gin, Elaine B. International Copyright Law: Beyond the WIPO & (and) TRIPS Debate. J. Pat. 
& Trademark Off. Soc'y 86 (2004): 763, 791. (“TRIPs’ reliance on sanctions and economic incentives 
may only work in the short term to ameliorate the North-South conflict, although it has significantly 
helped to bridge the gap between the civil and common law countries. Because copyright law is so 
fundamentally entrenched with social values, such as aesthetics, culture and freedom of expression, 
WIPO's long-term approach focused on norm-setting may be better in helping developing countries 
along the ‘learning curve’ concerning copyright law.”) 
110 UNEP, Rationalization of International Conventions on Biological Diversity (decision 14/26). 
Report of the Governing Council on its Work of its Fourteenth Session, 17 June 1987. Available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=100&ArticleID=1659&l=en. 
111 UNEP, Preparation of an International Legal Instrument on the Biological Diversity of the Planet 
(decision 15/34). Report of the Governing Council on its Work of its Fifteenth Session, 25 May 1989. 
Available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=71&ArticleID=963&l=en. 
112 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, adopted at the 
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Ramsar Convention covered wetlands and their resources.114 But none of them 
satisfied the global needs to conserve biodiversity worldwide. And the working group 
believed that a new global treaty on biodiversity conservation was urgently needed in 
the form of a framework treaty, building upon existing conventions.115 So, after the 
adoption and opening for signature in 1992, the convention entered into force in 
December 1993. Up to now, there are 194 Parties (168 Signatures).116 
 
CBD marks an historic commitment and a dramatic step by states to conserve 
biological diversity and to ensure that biological resources are used sustainably, with 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing provisions.117 While other conventions cover some 
portions of biodiversity, the convention on biological diversity is the first 
all-encompassing international agreement to cover all genes, species and 
ecosystems.118 But there are also some negative views about this CBD, arguing that 
lack of clarity, policy vacuum, domestic bureaucracy and high transaction costs are 
cannot-be-neglected concerns and drawbacks.119 While the CBD and ABS laws are 
good-intentioned and well-balanced in theory, it is quite different and inefficient to 
practically implement, monitor and enforce them in different state parties. What’s 
worse, the relationship between IP rights and the implementation of access and 
benefit-sharing arrangements is delicate and subtle,120  despite that it is widely 
acknowledged that IP system can adapt itself to accommodate this.121 And this is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization meeting in 
Paris, at its seventeenth session, 16 November 1972. 
113 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, signed at 
Washington, D.C., on 3 March 1973; amended at Bonn, on 22 June 1979. Its aim is to ensure that 
international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival. 
114 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance. The Ramsar Convention is the only 
global environmental treaty that deals with a particular ecosystem. The treaty was adopted in the 
Iranian city of Ramsar in 1971. 
115 See Convention on Biological Diversity, E&D File, Vol. 1 No. 4, Feb 1995. 
116  See CBD Official Website. List of Parties. Available at 
http://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml. Also see United Nation Treaty Collection. CHAPTER 
XXVII ENVIRONMENT, 8. Convention on Biological Diversity. Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-8&chapter=27&lang
=en#1. 
117 CBD. Article 1. Objectives; Article 15. Access to Genetic Resources.  
118  Groves, Craig. Drafting a Conservation Blueprint: A Practitioner's Guide to Planning For 
Biodiversity. Island Press, 2003, p 15-16. Also see Glowka, Lyle. Bioprospecting, Alien Invasive 
Species, and Hydrothermal Vents: Three Emerging Legal Issues in the Conservation and Sustainable 
Use of Biodiversity. Tul. Envtl. LJ 13 (2000): 329-471. 
119 Laird, Sarah A. Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: Equitable Partnerships in Practice. 
London: Earthscan Publications, 2002, p 373-374. 
120 This kind of doubt arises not only in CBD but also in other forums like WIPO, such as in the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge 
and Folklore. See WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/3, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, First Session, Geneva, April 30 to May 3, 
2001, par.68, p.22. 
121 For example, Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing. First meeting, 
Bonn, 22-26 October 2001. Report on the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the Implementation of 
Access and Benefit-sharing Arrangements. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/1/4, 10 August 2001, para. 17. (“It 
has been argued that traditional intellectual property rights regimes are not appropriate for the 
protection of traditional knowledge. However, it has also been suggested that such regimes could be 
adapted to accommodate traditional knowledge. In addition, sui generis systems for the protection of 
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vividly demonstrated in the tangled and chaotic relationship among CBD and WTO, 
WIPO and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.122 
 
2. Regional IP Regimes in Pacific Rim 
 
A. TPP 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed regional free trade agreement 
initiated by 4 pacific countries (Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei, known as 
the Pacific-4) and joined by US later in 2008. It is currently negotiated by twelve 
countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and several countries have shown their 
interest. And this US-oriented TPP trade agreement was joined by more countries 
(including Canada and Japan), to reach the objective of “shaping a high-standard, 
broad-based regional pact”123. So, representing nearly 40 percent of global GDP and 
about one-third of all world trade, TPP is an ambitious 21st-century regional trade and 
investment agreement. Despite that states had set targets for the settlement of 
negotiations in 2011, it is still under fierce negotiation and complex interest-balance 
to “achieve a comprehensive and transformative agreement with broadly shared 
benefits”,124 validating the TPP’s high-standard approach as a promising pathway to 
a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific.125 The 20th formal round negotiation was held 
in Ottawa, Canada on 3 - 13 July, 2014. Besides, the most notable country not 
involved in the negotiations is China, and China has reacted by accelerating its own 
trade initiatives in Asia.126 Some other assert that U.S. has repeatedly welcome 
China’s joining into TPP negotiation or other kinds of participation, and thus the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
traditional knowledge could be developed. ”) 
122 See COP 5. Decision V/26, Access to Genetic Resources. (A 15: “(d) Invites relevant international 
organizations, including the World Intellectual Property Organization, to analyze issues of intellectual 
property rights as they relate to access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing, including the provision 
of information on the origin of genetic resources, if known, when submitting applications for 
intellectual property rights, including patents; (e) Requests relevant international organizations, for 
example, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the International Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants, in their work on intellectual property rights issues, to take due account of 
relevant provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, including the impact of intellectual 
property rights on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, and in particular the 
value of knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity;”) 
123 Office of the United States Trade Representative. Trans-Pacific Partnership Announcement, 14 
December 2009. Available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/december/trans-pacific-partnership-anno
uncement. 
124 For example, The Real News. Wikileaks TPP Revelations Prove US in “Left Field” With Trade 
Deal. 15 December 2013. (“WikiLeaks recently released documents which shed light on the status of 
ongoing TPP negotiations. The revelations demonstrate deep disagreement between the United States 
and negotiating parties on the issues of intellectual property, agricultural subsidies, and financial 
services.”) 
125 2013 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Trade Ministers' Report to Leaders. October 8, 2013. 
Available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/tpp%20trade%20ministers%20report%20to%20leaders%201008
2013.pdf. 
126 Mireya, Solis. The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP. Brookings Institute. May 24, 2013. 
Available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/24-china-transpacific-partnership-solis.a 
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exclusion of China is not true. But it is evident that those diplomatic parlances are 
totally different from actual consideration of interests in international politics and 
international relations. TPP’s standards and proposed provisions are not acceptable to 
China and it is not feasible to accommodate the needs of both China and America 
with this set of norms, which is the actual exclusion of China from potential 
international law-making of this regional trade regime. On the whole, the exclusion of 
China,127 the possible US Congress’s not approval, and potential opposition from 
Asian-pacific developing countries to “new issues and new members”128 as well as 
other factors all cast shadows on the ratification and entering into force of TPP.129 
 
 
As for the intellectual property protection chapter, leaked draft texts of the agreement 
show that the IP chapter would have extensive negative ramifications for users’ 
freedom of speech, right to privacy and due process, and hinder peoples’ abilities to 
innovate.130 The provisions relating to the enforcement of patents and copyrights, 
alleged to be present in the US proposal, have been criticized as being excessively 
restrictive, going beyond those in the Korea-US trade agreement and 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).131 Also, TPP IP Chapter substantially 
reinforces and further develops the existing WTO TRIPs Agreement, so as to ensure 
“an effective and balanced approach”132 to intellectual property rights and “set the 
bar” for future agreements. All those were attempted by being based on TRIPs and 
borrowing heavily from ACTA,133 and also US domestic laws and US FTAs.134 
                                                          
127 See Armstrong, Shiro. Australia and the Future of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. No. 
23135. East Asian Bureau of Economic Research, 2011. (“[C]omplications will arise with a TPP to 
which China is not party.”)  Also see Lim, C. L., Deborah Kay Elms, and Patrick Low. The 
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Twenty-First Century Trade Agreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p 78-79. 
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Partnership Agreement. American University International Law Review 28.1 (2012): 105-205, 203. 
(“The problems for the United States can be described in terms of balance, inclusion, and democratic 
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130  See Electronic Frontier Foundation. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. Available at 
https://www.eff.org/issues/tpp. 
131 Flynn, Sean; Kaminski, Margot E.; Baker, Brook K.; and Koo, Jimmy H.. Public Interest Analysis 
of the US TPP Proposal for an IP Chapter (2011). PIJIP Research Paper Series. Paper 21. Available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/21. 
132 Office of the United States Trade Representative. Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement. November 12, 2011. Available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership
-agreement. 
133 See Sager, Carrie Ellen. TPP vs. ACTA - Line by Line. Infojustice. March 27, 2012. Available at 
http://infojustice.org/archives/9256. (By a comparison of the copyright enforcement provisions in the 
U.S. proposal for a TPP Chapter on IP with those in ACTA, it is concluded that the TPP is more 
restrictive than ACTA in many of the other areas where ACTA was controversial, including blocking 
circumvention of technological protection measures, criminalizing rights infringement, and allowing 
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In summary, from the perspective of its actual effects and strategic intents, TPP is 
attempting to expand and build up a set of much higher IP rights protection standards, 
grounded on WIPO Treaties, TRIPs, ACTA and US laws. This accumulative and 
progressive manner of international law-making is common and effective for 
international law,135 but the legality and legitimacy of those international IP rules are 
intensely questioned and doubted. 136  This reveals that international intellectual 
property lawmaking arena has grown ever more congested and complex, both 
horizontally across many international institutions and vertically from multilateral, 
bilateral and regional actors. This “forum shifting and regime complexity”137 offers 
many potential opportunities and risks to international IP lawmaking. 
 
B. RECP 
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a proposed FTA 
between ASEAN member states138 and ASEAN’s 10+1 FTA partners (including 
Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand). The RCEP was announced 
by the ASEAN Leaders in 2011 at the 19th ASEAN Summit. The negotiations for the 
RCEP were formally launched in November 2012 and aim to conclude by 
end-2015.139 The agreement is between 16 countries, making up 45% of world 
population and contributing 1/3 of the world’s GDP in total.140 RCEP would be “a 
modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial economic partnership 
agreement establishing an open trade and investment environment in the region to 
facilitate the expansion of regional trade and investment and contribute to global 
economic growth and development”.141 Similar to the TPP, the RCEP is also another 
                                                                                                                                                                      
substantial civil fines for infringement.) 
134 Such as the United States – South Korea Free Trade Agreement. 
135 Every IP treaty is just a beginning and not an endpoint. “While many countries believed that they 
were negotiating a ceiling on intellectual property rules, they quickly discovered that they actually had 
negotiated only a floor.” See Sell, Susan K. Private power, public law: the globalization of intellectual 
property rights. Vol. 88. Cambridge University Press, 2003, p 48. 
136 Especially about the transparency and secrecy of the negotiation, the potential damages of those 
rules to the balance of interests in IP laws, the protection of public interests and public space in the 
sphere of IP laws. As for other specific analysis on the doubts of TPP IP Proposal, see Flynn, Sean M., 
et al. US Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. 
American University International Law Review 28.1 (2012): 105-205. 
137 See Helfer, Laurence R. Regime shifting: the TRIPS agreement and new dynamics of international 
intellectual property lawmaking. Yale J. Int'l L. 29 (2004): 1, 6-9. (describing bilateral agreements as 
part of “regime shifting” strategies of the United States and the European Union, both dissatisfied with 
the limitations of TRIPS) 
138 Ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Brunei, Burma 
(Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. 
139  Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership. Available at 
http://www.asean.org/images/2012/documents/Guiding%20Principles%20and%20Objectives%20for%
20Negotiating%20the%20Regional%20Comprehensive%20Economic%20Partnership.pdf. 
140 Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore. What is the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP)? November 2012. Available at 
http://www.fta.gov.sg/press_release%5CFACTSHEET%20ON%20RCEP_final.pdf. 
141 See the Joint Declaration on the Launch of Negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership. 
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possible pathway to the construction of a free trade area across the Asia-Pacific.142 
The TPP and RCEP, as both mutually-reinforcing and comparatively competitive 
parallel tracks for regional integration, offer an excellent example for the study of 
institutional fragmentation of International IP Law and International Law. But RCEP 
is not working on a pre-determined membership. Instead, this arrangement is open to 
any other external economic partners. 
 
In accordance with the “Joint Declaration on the Launch of Negotiations for the 
RCEP”143 on 20 November 2012 and the “Guiding Principles and Objectives for 
Negotiating the RCEP”144 endorsed by RCEP Ministers on 30 August 2012, the 
RCEP negotiations will aim to do the following in the field of intellectual property: 
 
“The text on intellectual property in the RCEP will aim to reduce IP-related 
barriers to trade and investment by promoting economic integration and 
cooperation in the utilization, protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.”  
 
And a working group on intellectual property was established at the third round of the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Negotiations on 20–24 
January 2014. Although it is still not quite clear or certain about what degree of IP 
protection standards RECP would like to incorporate in the final trade agreement, it is 
greatly likely that more emphases would be put on issue like the balance of interest, 
development agenda in international IP protection, the compromise of provisions 
from CBD, WIPO and TRIPs; and that those treaty articles would goes in a direction 
different form TPP and ACTA. That’s because firstly, state parties to RECP always 
pay more attention to take a more balanced approach towards IP protection both in 
domestic legislations and international lawmaking processes, such as India and 
Australia.145 And New Zealand prefers the affirmation of the TRIPs standards.146 
                                                          
142 Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore. What is the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP)? November 2012. Available at 
http://www.fta.gov.sg/press_release%5CFACTSHEET%20ON%20RCEP_final.pdf. 
143 Joint Declaration on the Launch of Negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership. Available at http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2012/11/20121120003/20121120003-2.pdf. 
144  Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership. Available at 
http://www.asean.org/images/2012/documents/Guiding%20Principles%20and%20Objectives%20for%
20Negotiating%20the%20Regional%20Comprehensive%20Economic%20Partnership.pdf. 
145 India has always taken a firm position against too high-standard IP protection, such as in the UPOV. 
And Australia pays attention to the balanced protection of interests, such as in the copyright system, 
although it has to raise standards under US’s pressure. See Sahai, Suman. India's Plant Variety 
Protection and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001. Current Science 84.3 (2003): 407-412; Drahos, Peter, et al. 
Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual Property and Free Trade: the Case of the US–Australia Free Trade 
Agreement. Prometheus 22.3 (2004): 243-257. Also see Armstrong, Shiro. Australia and the Future of 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. No. 23135. East Asian Bureau of Economic Research, 2011, 
p 4. (“Australia’s Trade Minister, Craig Emerson, adopted many of the recommendations of the 
Productivity Commission's report including a recommendation that changes to the Australian 
pharmaceutical benefits scheme will not be negotiated in trade agreements, intellectual property rights 
(IPR) will not be strengthened through trade agreements and investor-state dispute settlement will not 
be included in trade agreements.”) 
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Secondly, some specific issues are the common and main concerns of RECP 
negotiators, such as access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing, public health and 
right to medicine, etc. So, the RECP IP text should be quite conservative towards 
US-led ever-increasing IP protection standards. 
 
To sum up, RECP is a good international regime for developing countries, emerging 
powers and also developed economies to come up with a solution unlike the 
“over-expansion of one-size-fits-all intellectual property laws”147 mode, so as to 
accommodate different policy goals without threats to numerous vital social and 
economic objectives. 
 
C. FTAAP 
At their annual summit in Vietnam in November 2006, the leaders of the 21 members 
of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum agreed to “seriously 
consider”148 negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and FTAAP 
would be by far the best available “Plan B” to restart widespread trade-liberalizing 
momentum if the WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA) fails in Geneva.149 In 
2007, Leaders endorsed the Regional Economic Integration (REI) Report to allow for 
a true trans-Pacific integration, providing for further ways and means to promote 
regional economic integration, including a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP) as a long-term prospect.150 Despite that there are already different patterns 
of economic restructuring and the approaches of implementation of REI or FTAs in 
Asia Pacific, in 2010 (in Japan), APEC Leaders concretized the vision by outlining 
“pathways to FTAAP”.151 And these pathways must be of high-standard to lead to a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
146 See Lim, C. L., Deborah Kay Elms, and Patrick Low. The Trans-Pacific Partnership A Quest for a 
Twenty-First Century Trade Agreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p 157, 159, 
169. (“Arguably, TRIPs is higher than is optimal, for some developing countries in particular.”) 
147 See Flynn, Sean M., et al. US Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement. American University International Law Review 28.1 (2012): 105-205, 108. 
Also see Mizaras, Vytautas, and Annette Kur. The Structure of Intellectual Property Law: Can One 
Size Fit All? Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2011, pt. IV, International IP Law: One Size Does Not 
Fit All. 
148 See APEC. 14th APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting 2006 - Ha Noi Declaration, 2006/AELM/DEC, 
2006/11/18. Available at 
http://mddb.apec.org/Pages/search.aspx?setting=ListMeeting&DateRange=2006/11/01%2C2006/11/en
d&Name=14th%20APEC%20Economic%20Leaders%u2019%20Meeting%202006. (“We shared the 
APEC Business Advisory Council’s (ABAC) views that while there are practical difficulties in 
negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific at this time, it would nonetheless be timely for APEC 
to seriously consider more effective avenues towards trade and investment liberalization in the 
Asia-Pacific region.”) 
149 See Bergsten, C. Fred. Toward a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific. Estudios Internacionales 
(2007): 159-162. And of course, there are different views about the prospects and feasibility of FTAAP, 
for example, (“[A]lthough such an agreement may well be beneficial from a narrowly economic 
standpoint, the reality of U.S. trade politics, of relations between Northeast Asian economies, and of 
APEC’s relative institutional weakness make it highly unlikely that an FTAAP will come to fruition in 
the short to medium term, regardless of whether the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) is successful or not. ”) 
150  See APEC. Identifying Convergences and Divergences in APEC RTAs/FTAs. 20th APEC 
Ministerial Meeting  
Lima, Peru, 19-20 November 2008, 2008/AMM/010. 
151 See APEC. 18th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting 2010 - Pathways to Free Trade Area of the 
28 
 
credible and meaningful FTAAP. The goal of FTAAP is to be “comprehensive, high 
quality and incorporate and address ‘next generation’ trade and investment issues”. 
 
Discussions on the possible pathways to an FTAAP continue and enhance the clarity 
as well as feasibility with potential roadmaps to the final realization of FTAAP. 
Identifying challenges to FTAAP and finding possible ways to overcome them can 
significantly facilitate the implementation of the “Action Plan Framework for REI 
Capacity Building Needs Initiative”,152 and the promotion of high-quality RTAs and 
FTAs (particularly here, the FTAAP) is a key element of the “Busan Roadmap 
towards the Bogor Goals”.153 Over the past several years, APEC has discussed the 
full range of issues relevant to the prospect of an FTAAP,154 and has conducted a 
significant body of analytic work related to an FTAAP, especially including the 
multi-year study on “convergences and divergences in APEC FTAs”155. Recently, the 
APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) have also expressed concern that Free 
Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) would be the most effective means for 
achieving the Bogor Goals and APEC should take greater strategic leadership to bring 
the FTAAP into reality starting with a roadmap.156  
 
Widely and always, it is believed that regional architectures like the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), the Pacific Alliance, the RCEP, and the TPP are all 
mutually reinforcing pathways to the FTAAP. Competition between different 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). Yokohama, Japan. 14 November 2010. 2010/AELM/DEC/2 (“Based on the 
results of this work, we have agreed that now is the time for APEC to translate FTAAP from an 
aspirational to a more concrete vision. To that end, we instruct APEC to take concrete steps toward 
realization of an FTAAP, which is a major instrument to further APEC's Regional Economic 
Integration (REI) agenda.” “We believe that an FTAAP should be pursued as a comprehensive free 
trade agreement by developing and building on ongoing regional undertakings, such as ASEAN+3, 
ASEAN+6, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, among others.” “In implementing the above, the 
following considerations should be taken into account: the changing contours of the global economic 
and trade architecture, particularly the proliferation of Free Trade Agreements and Regional Trade 
Agreements in the Asia-Pacific region;”) 
152 2012 CTI Report to Ministers. Appendix 1, Action Plan Framework for REI Capacity Building 
Needs Initiative, April 2, 2012. 
153 See APEC. 2005 Leaders' Declaration, Busan Declaration - Towards One Community: Meet the 
Challenge, Make the Change. Busan, Korea, 18 - 19 Nov 2005. Available at 
http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2005/2005_aelm.aspx. Also see APEC. 
2005 APEC Ministerial Meeting, Joint Statement - Towards One Community: Meet the Challenge, 
Make the Change. Busan, Korea, 15 - 16 Nov 2005. Available at 
http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Ministerial-Statements/Annual/2005/2005_amm.aspx. 
154 For example, the Leaders’ Agenda to Implement Structural Reform toward 2010 (LAISR 2010), the 
Report on Socio-Economic Disparity in the APEC region, and the APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist 
on Regulatory Reform. 
155  See APEC. Identifying Convergences and Divergences in APEC RTAs/FTAs. 20th APEC 
Ministerial Meeting  
Lima, Peru, 19-20 November 2008, 2008/AMM/010. 
156 APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC). Asia Pacific Business Leaders to Urge APEC to 
Intensify Work to Realize the FTAAP. Seattle, United States, 11 Jul 2014. Available at 
http://www.apec.org/Press/News-Releases/2014/0711_FTAAP.aspx. (ABAC was created by APEC 
Leaders in 1995 to be the primary voice of business in APEC. Each economy has three members who 
are appointed by their respective Leaders. They meet four times a year in preparation for the 
presentation of their recommendations to the Leaders in a dialogue that is a key event in the annual 
Leaders Meeting.) 
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international forums does help promote negotiations, and ensure the “natural selection” 
and “market de-selection” mechanism works to get the best balancing of interests, 
thus in a sense reducing the negative effects of monopolistic and asymmetric 
bargaining of big powers. But still, the proliferation of too many FTAs, REI plans and 
other similar initiatives would potentially damage the integrity of the multilateral 
trading system and increase the transaction costs, institutional losses and governance 
crisis of international trade. The existing and proposed agreements are poised to result 
in a veritable noodle bowl of RTAs, while the most ambitious plan is the FTAAP that 
envisions including all APEC members or some subset thereof.157 It is therefore 
timely for conversations on ensuring that multiple avenues to trade liberalization are 
complementary, cohesive and effective; and as for confirming a “future integration 
strategy that leverages the wave of reforms and RTAs”158, FTAAP seems to better 
suit than others. 
 
When it specifically comes into the IP issue, up to now, among those 30 RTAs/FTAs 
within APEC, only 3 ones (NAFTA, Australia - US FTA, and Korea - US FTA) have 
a IP chapter.159 Those 3 FTAs entered into force at different times, but were all 
concluded with US. So, it seems that this IP topic is particularly emphasized by US 
while other parties are fine with the existing international IP rules in WTO and other 
regimes. Undoubtedly, FTAAP surely cannot overlook this important international 
trade-related topic if it really wants to be the leading actor of Asian Pacific REI 
nowadays.160 And an independent IP chapter in the final text of FTA Agreement 
would be an indispensable part, especially for US and China. 
 
When China and U.S. used to have quite intense IP diplomatic battle both bilaterally 
and multilaterally, China seemed to be a firm supporter of developing countries camp. 
So did India. But right now, it is much more notable that this two big economies has 
much more common interests on the protection of IP, and thus it is imperative to 
develop IP rules in FTAAP to balance and construct Asian IP rules as well as regimes. 
And compared to TPP’s seemingly “anyone but China”161 Strategy and accordingly 
its negative externalities,162  FTAAP can better accommodate those conflicts of 
                                                          
157  See APEC. Identifying Convergences and Divergences in APEC RTAs/FTAs. 20th APEC 
Ministerial Meeting, Lima, Peru, 19-20 November 2008, 2008/AMM/010, p 11, 19. (“The Asia-Pacific 
region’s RTAs spree has followed and in some cases paralleled the regional economies’ overall 
economic and multilateral trade liberalization strategies, and has brewed into an increasingly dense 
regional noodle bowl of agreements.”) 
158  See APEC. Identifying Convergences and Divergences in APEC RTAs/FTAs. 20th APEC 
Ministerial Meeting, Lima, Peru, 19-20 November 2008, 2008/AMM/010, p 19. 
159  See APEC. Identifying Convergences and Divergences in APEC RTAs/FTAs. 20th APEC 
Ministerial Meeting, Lima, Peru, 19-20 November 2008, 2008/AMM/010, p 78-79. 
160 Regarding the importance of IP in today’s international trade, see Lim, C. L., Deborah Kay Elms, 
and Patrick Low. The Trans-Pacific Partnership A Quest for a Twenty-First Century Trade Agreement. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p 95. 
161 See David Pilling. It won’t be Easy to Build an “Anyone but China” Club. Financial Times, May 
22, 2013. Available at 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/08cf74f6-c216-11e2-8992-00144feab7de.html#axzz37iOnpAre. 
162 See Lim, C. L., Deborah Kay Elms, and Patrick Low. The Trans-Pacific Partnership A Quest for a 
Twenty-First Century Trade Agreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p 276. (“Latin 
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different interests and goals with APEC’s trade liberalization and regional economic 
integration attended to. 
 
3. Closing Remarks 
 
Many of the failures or malfunctions of international legal rules, both in terms of the 
institutional frameworks developed for their implementation and in terms of their 
judicial interpretation,163 have always had more to do with political willingness and 
international relation rather than pure legal obligations. 164  National economic 
interests and big-power politics are more talked and advocated,165 as if they were in 
some way natural and inevitable.166  
 
But when we can hardly overlook the importance of contemporary as well as future 
national interests, geographical relationship and international politics in the 
negotiation of international agreements, we should also be aware that other factors 
and conceptions also play critical roles in the construction of international regimes in 
today’s trade rounds, such as the working/formation of those rules and regimes. 
Realism is no longer the dominant doctrine in the studies of international relation, and 
constructivism, along with other social theories, are frequently borrowed into legal 
studies to better understand the formation, ratification and function of legal rules.167 
                                                                                                                                                                      
American countries participating in this process or considering joining it must be fully aware of its 
strategic backdrop, where Latin America plays a relatively minor role. In particular, they should be 
mindful of the potential implications on their relations with China of being part of an initiative that has 
sometimes been characterized as aimed at curbing China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific. Within this 
context, they should pragmatically decide on their participation and positioning in the talks, according 
to their own national interests.”) 
163 Coombe, Rosemary J. Intellectual Property, Human Rights & (and) Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in 
International Law Posed by Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of 
Biodiversity. Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 6 (1998): 59. 
164 See Leckie, Scott. Another Step towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Human Rights Quarterly (1998): 81-124. 
165  See Leckie, Scott. Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Maastricht Guidelines 
on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, SIM Special 20. (“Even when action is taken 
by human rights bodies or other criticism of violators is forthcoming, this is too frequently no match 
for what are increasingly perceived as larger State interests, in particular those linked to trade.” 
“Translating the provisions and positive forces of human rights law into concrete actions, however, 
remains one of the greatest challenges facing the human rights movement and the community of 
nations.”) 
166 UN, E/CN.4/SR.233, 2 July 1951, p 15. Also see Sigrun I. Skogly. Extra-national Obligations 
towards Economic and Social Rights. The International Council on Human Rights Policy, Council 
Meeting, Background Paper, 2002. (“After all, the Commission had to face up to the fact that a number 
of different political systems existed in the world, and to recognize that each of them had been built up 
for positive and not for evasive purposes.”) 
167  See Byers, Michael. Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and 
Customary International Law. Cambridge University Press, 1999, p 24. (“Waltz’s rejection of 
international law as a structural element within the international system might be regarded as a step 
away from a possible reconciliation between the discipline of international relations and international 
law. Nevertheless, the idea of structural or systematic controls on the exercise of unequal powers did 
leave open the possibility of incorporating international law into a more sophisticated realist 
conception of international relations. Although the absence of an overarching sovereign is clearly an 
important aspect of modern international society, it is not evident that the absence of an overarching 
sovereign should imply the absence of normative controls.”) 
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In this modern world society, international IP legal rule has its own unique way of 
making, and also a unique way of truly entering into force and become effective in 
their subsequent years or decades. And this “ethos” of International IP law is stressed 
against not only domestic laws but also other norms or phenomena. Next section will 
deliberate on the “authority” and “legitimacy” of Pacific Rim’ international IP 
regimes as well as rules in this world society. 
 
IV. Socio-legal Analysis of the Authorities and Legitimacy of Pacific Rim’  
International IP Regimes in a World Society 
 
1. Socio-legal Analysis of International IP Regimes in A World Society 
 
It is widely acknowledged that law has never been either autonomous or 
self-grounded in society, and so do international law and international IP law. For 
example, as for the implementation of international IP treaties, Deere, Carolyn’s book 
explores and details the political context of the TRIPs implementation in developing 
countries, and attributes the variation therein to the interplay between global IP 
politics and the implementation of IP reforms, with historic analyses and examples.168 
Also, it is believed that the remoter and more general aspects of the law are those that 
give it universal interest. And it is through them that a researcher not only becomes a 
great master in his/her calling, but also connects his/her subject with the universe and 
catches an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the 
universal law. 169  “[I]t is important to take a holistic view and bring in 
interdisciplinary perspectives to illuminate the vast areas that are related to, but 
technically fall outside, the intellectual property field”, and “the more 
interdisciplinary and holistic the discussion is, the more beneficial the debate will 
become.”170 Undoubtedly, amidst those, the method of socio-legal analysis stands out 
as an effective and indispensable interdisciplinary and multi-angle means. For 
example, historical study is a useful method as an exploration of the historical aspect 
of the social context in the study of legal pluralism.171 Seeing contemporary legal 
pluralism in historical context, moreover, offers the potential to produce general 
insights about the evolution of official legal systems (of various types) in terms of 
social expansion and institutional differentiation; it generates insights about how these 
official legal systems interact with other normative systems circulating within society; 
and it also evokes insights about how strategic actors negotiate these complexes of 
coexisting normative systems.172 
                                                          
168 Deere, Carolyn. The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of 
Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries. Oxford: New York, 2009. 
169 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The Path of the Law. 10 Harvard Law Review 457 (1897). 
170 Peter K. Yu. The Global Intellectual Property Order and its Undetermined Future. W.I.P.O.J. 2009, 
1(1), 10. 
171 For example, see Mosler, Hermann. The International Society as a Legal Community. Alphen aan 
den Rijn, the Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980, p 1. (“International law is the result of 
historical development. It did not exist from the very beginning of social relations between human 
beings.”) 
172 Tamanaha, Brian Z. Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global. Sydney L. 
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Fitzpatrick Peter173 proposes that law is derived from and constitutive of social 
existence and cultural context, by investigating the nature and grounds of law all the 
way from Enlightenment to 21st century with concepts evolving from nationalism, 
imperialism and globalism. Modern rule of law, with stability and ultimacy of 
determination, is debated to be ever-responsive and indeterminate, an isomorphic and 
mutually prehensile relationship which means both compatible and contrary with 
society, by deriving grounds from dynamics of modernity and exceed them.174 Law, 
used to be assumed as a parasitic existence, makes itself self-founding with 
determination and responsiveness, as a cutting into the infinite variety into society 
with denials and sacrifices.175 As for the role of law in nationalism and globalization, 
the dual making as well as configuration of law and nation176 take place not only 
within singular nation but also among nations, along with disjunction of modern 
imperialism and law, as well as the factuality of universally inclusive and mutually 
compensatory globalism.177 So, law existed in-between these two existential demands, 
and are always oriented towards both but never assuredly settled in either. There is a 
distinct positioning of law in the integral relation between determination and 
responsiveness: each demand went beyond the other but, in its incompleteness, it had 
ever to return to that other.178 In other words, the evolution of legal rules and regimes, 
whether domestic or international, need to make compromise between certainty and 
responsiveness, considering their distinct positioning and integral relation. Law 
sometimes needs to be responsive and pre-active, with simultaneous attention to 
certainty and sustainability; and sometimes it is required to be determinant and stable, 
with involvement of social change and creativity.179 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Rev. 30 (2008): 410. 
173 Fitzpatrick, Peter. Modernism and the Grounds of Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001. 
174 Fitzpatrick, Peter. Modernism and the Grounds of Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, P 4-5. 
175 Fitzpatrick, Peter. Modernism and the Grounds of Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, P 6. 
176 Nation combines those two dimensions (determinant and responsive) together.  
177 Fitzpatrick, Peter. Modernism and the Grounds of Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, P 7, 107. 
178 Fitzpatrick, Peter. Modernism and the Grounds of Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, P 218. 
179 Fitzpatrick, Peter. Modernism and the Grounds of Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, P218. “The capability of human rights to sustain this seeming dissonance may be found in 
their legal quality. Modern law was shown in the first part of this book as incapable of ‘being’ either in 
a determinate particularity or in a responsive-ness to all that ‘universally’ lay beyond the determinate. 
Law existed, rather, in-between these two existential demands, always oriented towards both and never 
assuredly settled in either. There was, however, a distinct positioning of law in the integral relation 
between the two demands, each demand went beyond the other but, in its incompleteness, and it had 
ever to return to that other. Like any legal artifact, then, human rights can always be otherwise than 
what they are. They exist not just in a determinant particularity but also in an illimitable 
responsiveness—nursing the ‘unconquerable hope’. In that lies their involving promise, yet also their 
seductive oppressions.” 
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Another book by Rodríguez Garavito, César A., and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
titled “Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality”,180 
combines both empirical research method and innovative socio-legal perspectives to 
explore the role of legal rules and politics under the big picture of law, social justice, 
and globalization, with a bottom-up angle borrowed from sociology and multi-sited 
case studies path imported from anthropology, to analyze and examine the meanings 
and utilities of invisible counter-hegemonic concept, subaltern cosmopolitan legality 
and their implication for the evolution of international governance, domestic and 
global democratic politics.181 Acknowledging the merits of governance approach of 
socio-legal analysis of hegemony and power in legal globalization,182 aiming at a 
“more realist understanding for the production of the production of the new 
international economic and political order”,183 namely the regimes as they are, this 
writing provides counter-hegemonic socio-legal investigation to unveil how and why 
they evolve, and the structure as it ought to be.184 But as mainly focused on the 
distinction between bottom-up and top-down approaches, this book is not able to 
stretch itself to some potential arguments that can be done merely pages away, such as 
how to understand and evaluate the bottom-up approach’s potential impacts on the 
redistribution or allocation of international authorities, what are the influences of this 
subaltern cosmopolitan legality on the operation of existing legal rules/regimes and 
the future international law-making or even the whole structure of international legal 
community, how about its theoretical revelation and practical effects on the 
interaction horizontally among international legal regimes and vertically between 
                                                          
180 Rodríguez Garavito, César A., and Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Law and Globalization from 
Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
181 And the case study topics of three thematic areas related to counter-hegemonic globalization 
(construction of a global economy of solidarity, reformation of international human right regimes and 
reconfiguration of human rights, local experiments in domestic/international participatory democracy 
and law-making) include: (1) comparison between subaltern cosmopolitan legality and neoliberal 
global governance, international labor rights against transnational anti-sweatshop coalitions in the 
Americans, TNCs’ corporate social responsibility and potential cooperate-friendly supervisory regimes, 
collision between right to antiretroviral medicines and TRIPs agreement, the gray zone of new 
immigrants’ housing right between legality and illegality, labor rights and immigrant rights as sites for 
cosmopolitan legality in South United States; (2) the role of Indian Supreme Court to protect the rights 
of families in dam constructions, gradual shift of property right systems in Brazil related to the 
Movement of Landless, collective and indigenous rights in Columbia against oil exploration, The 
potential of two counter-hegemonic international legal framework (the “defensive” ICC and 
“oppositional” common heritage of human regime); (3) “gender budgeting” movement in Tanzania for 
gender justice and participatory democracy, the “participatory budgeting” counter-hegemonic initiative 
in Brazil and its success-building factors and inner tensions, the bottom-up practices of rights against 
state authorities concerning the vulnerability and survival in Indian constitutional law, case study of 
Portuguese environmental law regarding grassroots participation and crisis of former “community 
consultation”. Rodríguez Garavito, César A., and Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Law and Globalization 
from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 
1-18. 
182 Rodríguez Garavito, César A., and Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Law and Globalization from 
Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 12. 
183 Yves Dezalay, Bryant G. Garth Dezalay, Legitimating the New Legal Orthodoxy, p 306-334, The 
Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy, edited by Yves, and Bryant G. 
Garth. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 
184 As Austin and Bentham did, on the separation of law as it is and law as it ought to be. H. L. A. Hart, 
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71 (1958), p 593-529. 
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domestic legal rules and international law, what about the concepts of legality and 
legitimacy of international legal rules, etc.. 
 
And on the other hand, the lack of socio-legal analysis in the study of some topics of 
international law would be a regrettable flaw, which makes the whole theoretical 
argument and case studies in futility. For example, in “Trading fish, Saving Fish: the 
Interaction between Regimes in International Law”,185 without systematic application 
of the socio-legal study method and reference from other related disciplines regarding 
“regime”, 186  this topic-structured argument seems to be not persuasive and 
comprehensive enough in terms of the goal, which is how the regimes interact and 
should interact. When the framework of regime interaction concerning the 
fragmentation and legitimacy of international law, and also the multiple (procedural 
and substantive) bases of regime interaction among and within regimes are 
deliberated, it seems not able to proceed deeply into the investigation without 
concepts and research approaches imported from socio-legal study of international 
law.187  
 
Just as Sebastian Haunss and Kenneth C. Shadlen argued: 
 
“Most studies [of intellectual property policy-making] focus on national and 
international IP laws. But while laws are solidified results of social struggles and 
political conflicts, understanding the law itself tells us little about the social 
processes that lay behind laws and even less about the social dynamics that will 
eventually challenge and often change them. Laws establish opportunities for 
action, and strictly legal perspectives in most cases say little about different 
actors’ motivations and capacities to exploit these opportunities and how the 
motivations and capacities change over time.”188 
 
Peer Zumbansen had also said as follows about the globalization and transnational 
law: 
 
“Seen from that angle, TL is an illustration of law’s attempt to reposition itself in 
relation to the depictions of a globalizing world offered by disciplines such as 
political science, sociology, economics, geography or anthropology. At the same 
                                                          
185 Margaret A. Young. Trading fish, Saving Fish: the Interaction between Regimes in International 
Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
186 For example, see Rittberger, Volker, and Peter Mayer. Regime Theory and International Relations. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 
187  See Margaret A. Young. Trading fish, Saving Fish: the Interaction between Regimes in 
International Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, Part III, Towards Regime Interaction. 
For example, if we expand the discussion in chapter 7 (the bases and legitimacy of regime interaction) 
with the concept of “allocation of authority” in mind, more empirically general and positive-law 
conclusions can be expected. 
188 Sebastian Haunss and Kenneth C. Shadlen. Introduction: Rethinking the Politics of Intellectual 
Property. In Haunss, Sebastian, and Kenneth C. Shadlen, eds. Politics of Intellectual Property: 
Contestation Over the Ownership, Use, and Control of Knowledge and Information. Cheltenham, U.K.: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009. 
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time it builds on a longstanding inquiry into the role of law in the context of 
differentiated, modern societies. From that perspective, then, thinking about law 
in a transnational dimension becomes woven into conceptualizations of the 
nature and role of law in society. Society is now understand as ‘world society’, 
that is, as a society which as the subject of investigation not only transgresses 
and deconstructs the confining space of a particular jurisdiction or nation-state, 
but also questions the attempt to position society in a bi-polar relation vis-à-vis 
the state. What follows from these observations, even in a cursory treatment of 
the subject such as in the present context, is the recognition that transnational 
law presents an important opportunity to reflect on law and its connections with 
ongoing investigations into local and global forms, institutions and processes of 
governance.”189 
 
“In the term’s long history, its variances can be attributed mostly to the different 
doctrinal and theoretical backgrounds of those employing it. This…will introduce 
the grand strands of discussion in different branches of legal doctrine and theory 
by way of visiting and revisiting the places and times of TL in the historical and 
legal consciousness.”190 
 
Also, specifically, as for the socio-legal analysis and other sociological research 
methods used in the studies of jurisprudence, lately there are two books (superlatively 
about the study of Constitution and the formation process of EU) that can provide 
some references and guidance to this paper.191 And the Cambridge University Press 
has published a series of books on the “Studies in Law and Society”, which is 
absolutely compelling.192 
 
2. Authorities and Legitimacy of Pacific Rim’ International IP Regimes in A 
World Society  
 
A. The Concept of “Authority” and “Legitimacy” 
The modern international legal studies have changed a lot with a turnaround from the 
19th century, since philosophical controversies have given their way to pragmatic 
discipline as well as problem solving; and the most basic doctrinal and philosophical 
underpinnings for international law are eroded, rejected and replaced by new attitudes 
that are concrete and disciplinary in the studies of modern international law.193 The 
                                                          
189  Zumbansen, Peer. Transnational Law, Evolving. In Smits, J. M. Elgar, Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law. Cheltenham, U.K. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, p 899. 
190  Zumbansen, Peer. Transnational Law, Evolving. In Smits, J. M. Elgar, Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law. Cheltenham, U.K. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, p 903. 
191  Chris Thornhill. A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in 
Historical-Sociological Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, P 1, 3. Mikael 
Rask Madsen and Chris Thornhill. Law and the Formation of Modern Europe: Perspectives from the 
Historical Sociology of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
192  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Studies in Law and Society. Available at 
http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/law/socio-legal-studies/series/cambridge-studies-law-
and-society. 
193 See Kennedy, David. International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion. Nordic 
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old fashioned legal formalism has also given its way to a modern legal science of 
context, process and value, moving from absolute to relative norms, from a 
disembodied and autonomous legal culture to one engaged with other fields; and 
modern international law has attuned to the needs of real-world problems with 
pragmatic attitudes and disciplinary attentions to what is effective, functional, and 
what are the real actors and sites.194 All those are not implying that theories, 
hypothetical deductions and reasoning are not useful any more, but are emphasizing 
that development of theoretical researches must firmly grasp the so-called “key and 
soul” in the reality of the practice of international laws, constantly trying to use more 
accurate, more tangible concepts and theories to describe the generation, application 
and innovation of international law in this world society. Professor Bodenheime 
Edgar said that “[An] explanation of concepts, unaccompanied by a thorough 
consideration of the social factors which may justify an expansion, contraction or 
re-formation of the concept, cannot be regarded as a great step forward…”195, and 
Professor H. L. A, Hart agreed with the need for further elucidation to understand our 
own apparatus and stay away from predicaments: We may know how to use these 
concepts, but we cannot say how or describe how we do this in ways which are 
intelligible to others and indeed to ourselves.196  
 
Particularly here in international law, situating concepts, processes and also reasoning 
under the broad context of world society is accepted as a brilliant method to get more 
dynamic and concrete interpretations and understandings of phenomena. For example, 
much in transnational law turns on the relationship between law and the states with 
new looks, or investigate law and society in a more comprehensive sense, whereas in 
this understanding of “world society” 197  with “distinct constituency of world 
society”198, “the state does not sit ‘on top’ of society (or the market), but is part of 
society”.199 Also, scholars are totally aware of “a degree of normative integration 
between international law and world society”.200 So, we need to extend the argument 
of the institutional fragmentation of international (IP) law under the context of this 
“world society”, and use terminologies of socio-legal studies different from the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Journal of International Law 65.3 (1996): 385-420. Also see Charles DeBenedetti. Origins of the 
Modern American Peace Movement, 1915-1929. KTO Press, 1978, p 27-29. 
194 See Kennedy, David. International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion. Nordic 
Journal of International Law 65.3 (1996): 387. 
195 Bodenheimer, Edgar. Modern Analytical Jurisprudence and the Limits of Its Usefulness. U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 104 (1955): 1080, 1083. 
196  Hart, H. L. A. Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor 
Bodenheimer. U. Pa. L. Rev. 105 (1956): 953-975, 964. 
197 Luhmann Niklas. The World Society as a Social System. International Journal of General Systems, 
Volume 8, Issue 3, 1982, 131-138. Also see Luhmann Niklas. Globalization or World Society: How to 
Conceive of Modern Society? International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie, 
Volume 7, Issue 1, 1997, 67-79. 
198 How to understand the “the distinct constituency of world society”? See Ian Clark. International 
Legitimacy and World Society. Oxford. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
199  Zumbansen, Peer. Transnational Law, Evolving. In Smits, J. M. Elgar, Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law. Cheltenham, U.K. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, p 899-900. 
200 See Ian Clark. International Legitimacy and World Society. Oxford. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007. 
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previous legal studies on international law and national legal systems to depict and 
exposit the empirically practical interactions and logically casual relationships, which 
are in the center of this topic. 
 
But to clarify, this paper is not entirely for (actually, it tends to be skeptical and 
critical towards) the “more or less”201 criterion and “normative continuum”202 theory 
with respects to the normativity in international (IP) law, despite that socio-legal 
analysis seems to include more factors and angles apart from legal texts. All those 
clarifications and demonstrations are meant to capture the latest dynamic essences in 
the contemporary development of international law, and meanwhile only a small part 
of the theories of international legal studies are confronted with tiny amendment or 
adjustment. Taking account of the shared risks that those “not entirely new” 
manifestations may grow “extremely diverse, fragmented and of an unprecedented 
degree”203, it is also concerned whether those new phenomena and accordingly 
adapted interpretations should be or could be regarded as the reflection of a healthy 
legal pluralism and a daunting fragmentation.204  
 
But, one noteworthy problem right here is that the discussion of “institutional 
fragmentation of international IP law” is somehow already fragmented and diversified 
with various theories, emphases, suggestions and designs,205 to an extent that the 
fundamental landscape and basic operational nature of international IP law is never 
clearly investigated and shapely inspected, even tending to be overlooked and covered 
in the darkness for another while. 206 Although we have been separately talking about 
the normative and institutional aspects of fragmentation and pluralism so that our 
arguments could be more targeted and responsive, some scholar points out that 
technical account (normative) and jurisdictional understanding of legal authority 
(institutional) are problematic as it cannot capture the full impact of fragmentation 
                                                          
201 See Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 393. (It argues that the tendency of international 
law-making to move from treaty into instruments of the most varied kinds such as decisions, 
recommendations, reports etc., has put strains on the ascertainment of valid law. Its normativity has 
become a matter of ‘‘more or less’’, an evaluation which traditional methods of law-ascertainment are 
not well equipped to deal with.) 
202 See Wolfrum, Rüdiger and Volker Röben. Developments of International Law in Treaty Making. 
Berlin: Springer, 2005, p 409-416. 
203  Aspremont, Jean d'. Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the 
Ascertainment of Legal Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p 2, 81-82, 114. 
204 See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International 
Law. LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 22 (2009): 1-28. Also see Mario Prost. All Shouting the Same Slogans: 
International Law’s Unities and the Politics of Fragmentation. 17 Finnish Yearbook of International 
Law (2006), 131-159. 
205 See Bailliet, Cecilia. Non-State Actors, Soft Law, and Protective Regimes: From the Margins. 
Cambridge [UK]: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p 148. 
206 For example, in “Fragmentation(s) of International Law: On Normative Integration as Authority 
Allocation”, Dr Tomer Broude argues that the “fragmentation” discourse is itself fragmented, with 
problems of norm fragmentation (e.g., conflicting rules) discussed separately from those relating to the 
fragmentation of authority (e.g., competing jurisdiction). This is complementary and critical to the ILC 
Report since the latter didn’t talk about the jurisdiction conflicts. Lapidoth, Ruth, Tomer Broude, and 
Yuval Shany. The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, 
Supremacy and Subsidiarity; Essays in Honour of Professor Ruth Lapidoth. Oxford: Hart, 2008, p 8. 
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and plurality, and theoretical approaches should be paid more attention before going 
specifically into details.207 The institutional fragmentation of international (IP) law 
can never be truly understood without investigation on specific normative issues. And 
vice versa. Besides, an “uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate”208 can never be 
arrived at except when we have grasped our topic “based on empirical research, 
historical and comparative analyses, interdisciplinary insights and holistic 
perspectives”209. And by all those, with exploration of main aspects of international IP 
regimes including (but not limited to) the legal framework, institutional dynamics, 
and their interactional mechanism, this paper attempts to present the “lost heaven” 
scenery in regards to the interpretation of the institutional fragmentation of 
international IP law. The core part of this paper’s argument is to grasp, sort out and 
then reorganize those befitting perspectives and legal concepts in the narratives of the 
institutional fragmentation of international IP law. 
 
Then, the question turns out to be: what is the structure for those appropriate 
perspectives, and more specifically, what are the core concepts in this argument that 
can be the starting points as well as theoretical bearers of this demonstration? And 
this paper considers that “authority” and “legitimacy” should be the core conceps and 
significant pillars of this argument. 
 
The first question is: why is authority, other than sovereignty, power or other concepts, 
so indispensable in the researches of this institutional fragmentation of international 
(IP) law? That’s because authority has always been closely related to “jurisdiction” in 
the legal studies of both procedurally dynamic interactions and substantively 
structural/relational changes of those international regimes on the one hand, and on 
the other hand it is closed related to the sociological investigation and interpretation 
of the fragmentation of international (IP) law.210 And that is much more true and 
pertinent for the institutional fragmentation phenomenon as these multiple, coexisting 
and overlapping regimes are essentially competing sources of authority.211  
 
Some academics have already conducted excellent researches on the concept of 
“authority” from the perspective of the fragmentation of international law. Firstly, one 
                                                          
207 See Roughan, Nicole. Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013, p 3-5. Also see Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh. Questions of 
Jurisdiction. In McVeigh, Shaun, eds. Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction. Abingdon [England]: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007, p 3-18. 
208 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
209 Peter K. Yu. The Global Intellectual Property Order and its Undetermined Future. W.I.P.O.J. 2009, 
1(1), 2. 
210 Despite that different authors and academic writings use this concept of “authority” from various 
perspectives with different connotations, it is acknowledged that this analytical concept is quite useful, 
and also quite controversial at the same time, in legal studies. See Raz, Joseph. The Authority of Law: 
Essays on Law and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p 3. (“There is no surprise that 
the notion of authority is one of the most controversial concepts found in the armoury of legal and 
political philosophy. Its central role in any discussion of legitimate forms of social organization and of 
legitimate forms of political action makes the indefinite continuation of this controversy inevitable.”) 
211 Tamanaha, Brian Z. Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global. Sydney L. 
Rev. 30 (2008): 375. 
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symposium edited by Lapidoth, Ruth, Tomer Broude, and Yuval Shany 212  is 
enlightening in that it inspects the fragmentation of international law from the 
perspective of its making source — allocation of “authority” in international law, 
which enables us examine many notions like functional state sovereignty, 
international authority, efficacy and legitimacy, interaction and coordination, and the 
structure of international legal system, with totally new approaches and entry 
points.213 This volume focuses on three legal concepts (sovereignty, supremacy and 
subsidiarity) to examine the tensions between the traditional concept of sovereignty 
and the modern shifting allocation of decision-making authority to international 
regimes (including international organizations, courts and other international actors). 
It confirms the importance of the concept of sovereignty along with 
acknowledgements towards multi-level governance, horizontal and vertical allocation 
of authority in international law. 214  And it is also concerned with that the 
uncoordinated nature of the shifts in the allocation of authority in modern 
international law would encourage potentially conflicting decision-making processes, 
resulting in incompatible norm-promulgation, norm-interpretation and dispute 
resolution.215 Namely, “who should decide what” in this international system that 
formally lacks a central authority? It is a question that lies at the very heart of the 
political legitimacy of international law as a system of governance, which is 
essentially a question of international constitutional dimensions. Normative 
fragmentation and the shifting allocation of authority all goes to our question at hand: 
the institutional fragmentation of international law.  
 
Furthermore, Roughan Nicole’s book in 2013 “Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, 
and Transnational Legal Theory” 216  pays special attention to the concept of 
“authority” itself, situated under the challenge posed by fragmentation and pluralism 
in international society with so many overlapping and conflicting purported 
authorities, and it constructs a theory of “relative authority” to explain the generating 
texture and preconditions, the interrelationship and interaction of those authorities, 
and how that influences their legitimacy. This writing is really useful to the research 
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216 Roughan, Nicole. Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013. 
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of the institutional fragmentation of international (IP) law since it goes directly to the 
headwater of fragmentation and pluralism of international law: the legislative 
authority of international regimes.217 More importantly and more unusually, Roughan 
Nicole focuses on theoretically arguing about the role of the concept of “authority” in 
interpreting fragmentation and legal plurality without result-tendencies and 
countermeasure-preferences, without being technically entangled with specific rules 
or any strategic case studies. Thus, by trying to provide a persuasive theory of 
authority and legitimacy and expounding its illumination on the interaction of 
authorities and pluralism/fragmentation, this book condenses puzzles of plurality and 
multiple authorities into the relative authority with a relational approach. Roughan 
Nicole particularly exposit the use of relative authority in public international law and 
transnational law, re-conceptualizing the concepts of state, sovereignty, international 
law’s fragmentation, and legitimacy.218 The most important and innovative point 
therein is the relationship-seeking approach and this interactive/inter-dependent 
analysis of international regimes and actors,219 considering the relationship as part of 
some “system” 220  and meanwhile taking authority and legitimacy as the core 
structure in this socio-legal study. Although there may be disagreement among 
lawyers and scholars about the systemic relationship or the international/transnational 
law as a certain “system”, it is widely agreed that it is one of the tasks of international 
law’s legal reasoning to establish it.221 And Roughan Nicole claims that although 
these institutions might be functionally distinct, respectively constituted, and 
independently authorized by diverse founders and member states, the legitimacy of 
their authority is interactive, interdependent and conditional upon their justified 
interrelationships.222 
 
Scholars indicate that “the question of jurisdiction engages with the fact that there is 
law, and with the power and authority to speak in the name of the law. It encompasses 
                                                          
217 Roughan, Nicole. Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory. Oxford: 
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the authorization and ordering of law as such as well as determinations of authority 
within a legal regime. Emile Benveniste has drawn out the inaugural character of the 
etymology of jurisdiction.”223 Also, to some extent, the fragmentation phenomenon 
comes into existence because the traditional exclusive and dominant subject of 
international law, states, is actually on the decline and in return is further weakening 
recognized international regimes controlled or driven by states.224 This argument on 
authority is innovative and enlightening, since it breaks from the traditional 
state-centered approach/conception into this new “world society”225 and gets rid of 
the negative constraints of “sovereignty” on the understanding of the dimension, 
structure and ethos of international law.226 And this close relationship between 
“jurisdiction” legally and “authority” sociologically can provides quite many 
potentials to be looked forward.227 “As a part of a discourse of moral authority, 
jurisdiction takes its place as an embodiment of value, or as a partial step towards 
value. Such approaches risk losing the questions of ‘why law?’ or ‘why this law?’ and 
with them the question of the authority and form of law. To address such questions 
ties jurisprudence back to the diction or speech of law and returns the process of 
jurisdiction both to a structure (or metaphysics) of law and to a history of the 
institutions that carry the meaning of legal life.”228  
 
So, questions related to authority, states and the structural turn of international law are 
always in the central arguments of the institutional fragmentation of international law. 
For example, do those international law-making regimes really have their own/ 
autonomous “authority” after their initial formation or the coming into force of the 
establishment treaties, and whether there is any change to this degree of authority 
later in the interaction of related regimes? Is there a difference between some 
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executing agencies (like the Secretariat) and the empowering of quasi-judicial 
mechanism? How to understand the “interdependent with necessary connections, and 
self-autonomous with inner ethos” interrelationship of international IP regimes,229 
from the perspective of authority in social interactionism as well as social 
governance? 
 
The second question is: why is the concept of “legitimacy” so significant in the 
discussion of this institutional fragmentation of international (IP) law?  
 
The concept of “legitimacy” is a core notion in the studies of international law, like 
conflict of rules and international governance in world society, while sometimes it is 
indescribable but ubiquitous.230 And legitimacy is a quite useful analytical concept 
for international lawyers, which can have profound practical implications for the 
reach and application of international law. 231  What’s more, this concept of 
“legitimacy” helps a lot to break through traditional dichotomy and connect the 
normative aspect of international law and the powers in international politics.232 And 
that’s why in this paper, “legitimacy” is more descriptively socio-legal than 
normative. 
 
“Structural realists considered systems theory to be unsatisfactory because it 
involved the regulation of actors through systems which those actors had 
themselves created. They favored instead what was in effect a new systems 
theory which focused on the larger system, or structure, within which actors 
operate. For Waltz, this larger structure included an ordering principle, the 
specialization of the functions of differentiated units, and the distribution of 
capacities across those units. Although it is conceivable that Waltz could 
have included international law among those structural elements which 
determine how actors in the international system behave, he argued instead 
that unequal states engage each other in a system, the defining structural 
aspect of which is anarchy. Anarchy – the absence of an overarching 
sovereign – was by definition incompatible with law.” 
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231 See Thomas, Christopher A. The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law. Oxford 
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the significance of international law to international politics.”) 
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“Waltz’s rejection of international law as a structural element within the 
international system might be regarded as a step away from a possible 
reconciliation between the discipline of international relations and 
international law. Nevertheless, the idea of structural or systematic controls 
on the exercise of unequal powers did leave open the possibility of 
incorporating international law into a more sophisticated realist conception 
of international relations. Although the absence of an overarching sovereign 
is clearly an important aspect of modern international society, it is not 
evident that the absence of an overarching sovereign should imply the 
absence of normative controls.”233 
 
 
There are several significant reasons as follows regarding why we should and we need 
to take “legitimacy” as an essential point in the reasoning and argument of the 
institutional fragmentation of international (IP) law. Firstly, the concept of 
“legitimacy” has already got its firm foothold in the studies of international law and is 
replacing the principle of effectiveness rapidly, 234  in the interpretation and 
understanding of politics and social norms and particularly here the international 
law’s creation and operation.235 And concomitantly, the definitions and connotations 
of legitimacy regarding international legal rules and topics should be examined, and 
polished up in many issues from time to time to make sure that those issues are 
tackled in a right way.236 Secondly, it is really crucial to have a consistently clear and, 
more importantly, universal concept of legitimacy in international law.237 Scholars 
are always arguing and analyzing about different topics in international law to get a 
consistent concept of legitimacy upwards on the one hand, and apply the concept of 
legitimacy downwards to various subfields to test and refine it on the other hand.238 
Thirdly, legitimacy is also closely interrelated and tangled with the concept of 
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235 See Buchanan, Allen E. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 145-161. 
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“legality” and “authority”.239 All of those can provide us macro-insights about the 
international law-making and the creation, development, dominance, maintenance and 
ultimate collapse of international rules and regimes. 
 
B. Pacific Rim’s Flux of International IP Regimes 
Here in this paper, these two concepts of “authority” and “legitimacy” are more 
socio-interactional, in-between, dynamic and descriptive, rather than individual, 
internal, static and normative.240 From the perspective of specific and microscopic 
investigation, “authority” reconstructs the concept and connotations of rule-making 
regime in international law. There are so many various international legal regimes, as 
interactive authorities with different degrees of practical powers, effects and roles. As 
long as those international institutions are legally established and functionally 
operating, gravity-like interactions and mutual-impacting reactions are taking place 
all the time, just like those celestial bodies and stars in the universe. And regimes in a 
certain sub-field of international law may interact more extensively with others in 
small systems like the solar system, while action principles and processes are all 
interlinked and connected. Those stars in diverse shapes are of different qualities, and 
always in evolution and changes. Also, the gravity of different regimes depends on 
their mastery capability to corresponding jurisdictions and issues. Legitimacy is 
actually an important aspect of that evaluation. 
 
As for “legitimacy”, it is examined and looked more from the perspective of external 
evaluation and accreditation in some time nodes during the interaction, and also from 
the perspective of bigger context concerning regimes’ future construction and 
development, rather than the normative provisions and effects.241 The legitimacy of a 
certain regime depends on the quality of those specific rules therein, regime’s 
inclusion of the issues into its jurisdiction,242 and also regime’s ability to respond and 
correspondingly evolve forward, three of which are closely linked and mutually 
influenced.243 Apart from this perspective of individual regime’s development, from 
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the other perspective of those regimes’ interaction and development on a whole in this 
“universe of stars”, the legitimacy of them, as both individual authorities and an 
integrated system, 244  is interdependent and conditional upon their justified 
interrelationships.245 Furthermore, all branches of international law, and even the 
whole system of international law, can be explained by such a conceptual framework 
and analysis mode, thus getting a better understanding of how international legal rules 
and regimes are created, maintained and repealed.246 
 
Specifically addressed onto the international intellectual property regimes in Pacific 
Rim, these concepts could be innovative and enlightening to interpret the phenomena 
of regime competition and mutual interactive containment in international IP law. 
And the competitions and containments among different regimes are bound to bring 
about tangible changes and effects on the creation of regimes and function of the rules, 
which is about the legitimacy of those regimes as international IP authorities.  
 
Firstly, the negotiation of the establishment or the upgrading of an international (IP) 
regime is likely to be more prolonged and flexuous in the existing power-oriented 
negotiation paradigm. Meanwhile, a strong leadership, by some certain big power(s) 
with decisive negotiation skills and bargaining powers, is expected to emerge to keep 
the quasi-legislative international rule-making round moving forward, given the 
reality that the paradigm is not easily reversed but seems to be reinforced in the 
absence of previous “somehow effective” 247  landscape. 248  And only when the 
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participating countries have good assessments of the potential costs-benefit analysis 
could relevant international regimes be probably established. Afterwards, the 
legitimacy of those regimes depends on its bigger context within a structural system 
and also its capacity to control the international law-making framing points, such as 
the balance of the south-north conflict of interests in international IP protection, the 
basic human rights concerns in developing countries, some overlapping or 
interdisciplinary IP themes,249 and other potential trade-offs on the negotiation table. 
And the other way around, the increase or the decrease of those regimes’ legitimacy 
interactively and altogether affects the backdrop and framework of international 
law-making and temporal international politics.250 That was what happened in the 
negotiation of TRIPs, and that’s what we are hoping for right now in the negotiation 
of TPP.251 
 
Secondly, in the process of the operation and actual functioning of those regimes and 
rules, impacts and shock waves of the authority and legitimacy from other regimes 
and sub-systems are always tangible; and they are directly reflected in many ways, 
such as whether evasion of law is tactically used by Member states as a strategy, 
whether the Member States support or abandon rules’ further developments and more 
extensive uses.252 It also ultimately determines whether a regime that is generated 
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through difficult negotiations may be very short-lived, rapidly invalid, or not. This 
occasion happened between WIPO and WTO TRIPs Agreement, and it may happen 
again among TRIPs, TPP/RECP and other potential regimes in Pacific Rim. The 
systematic or structural perspective, with legitimacy as its essential pillar, is exactly 
one of the connotations of the concept of legitimacy of those IP authorities in this 
world society.253  
 
Thirdly, the proliferation of authorities and big powers in Pacific Rim will 
significantly reduce the possibility of reaching an agreement on IP and related trade 
issues, unless several core big powers among the states reach a certain sort of 
compromise and work together to establish a new leading partnership. The 
decentralization of authorities exacerbate the proliferation of regimes and rule 
systems, as more authorities tend to grasp the right to international law-making other 
than just follow rules made by other stakeholders, while former dominant states don’t 
want to let go their scepter.254 This probably lead to higher overall “transaction costs” 
in the cost-benefit analysis, while every state tries to maximize its own input-output 
ratio.255 Meanwhile, the emergence of more regimes and rules could lead to two 
possible outcomes: one is that more various systems appear, and the differentiation 
and specialization of regimes tend to be more fierce; the second possible result is that 
those adverse consequences, as a result of this proliferation, make countries recognize 
the significance of interdependence in this symbiotic era of globalization, and 
stakeholders reach a big compromise and convergence is realized.256 
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3. Future Institutional Development of International IP Law in Pacific Rim 
 
It is always not easy and sometimes risky to predict the future development of those 
international IP regimes. As for the competition and coexistence of so many different 
international IP regimes in Pacific Rim, this paper considers that the following 
arguments are likely to be appropriate and anticipated. 
 
Firstly, China will not accept or accede to the TPP’s high standards on IP protection 
right now. TPP’s IP protection standards are still too high for China’s present needs, 
notwithstanding that it is argued by some scholars that China also need international 
IP protection system to safeguard its national interests of overseas investment and 
international competition. Although it is still full of variables and X factors on 
whether those negotiating parties could come up with a successful TPP agreement and 
whether China is interested in joining TPP, China is likely to continue to build up its 
own “home court” to compete with TPP, and this is the basic roadmap and strategic 
cards before any possible “big compromise”. The decentralization of authorities and 
the longstanding lack of legitimacy of high protection rules (on IP and other related 
trade topics), particularly from the perspective of developing countries, and also 
China’s huge economy size, have rendered China enough bargaining powers.  
 
Secondly, TPP will not be able to succeed and sustain without China’s 
participation.257 Given the sensitiveness of those negotiation issues and the sharp 
increase of China’s strength, any similar economic integration plan without China in 
Pacific Rim is in big lack of legitimacy and authority.258 Here, the “succeed and 
sustain” of TPP does not simply mean its craft and passage, but more from the 
perspective of US’s strategic demands: TPP is a template of next generation’s 
international trade and IP protection treaties; and TPP represents US’s global 
influences in Asia and Pacific Rim, both economically and politically. It is argued 
here that TPP seems to be incompetent for US’s ambitions and China’s possible 
participation, whether in the form of “big compromise” with US or the “all or nothing” 
gambling mode. That’s because an absence of China and consequentially a lack of 
legitimacy would do fundamental damages to the inclusiveness and authority of TPP, 
leaving the future grand blueprint envisaged by US wiped out. Namely, the 
participation of China, Japan and US is the basic   elements for a possible Pacific 
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Rim integration arrangement.259 As for the Sino-Us relation, both particularly here on 
the international IP law-making and generally to global governance, neither “losing 
China again” nor “isolation from the world” is an acceptable option for US and China.  
 
Thirdly, in the Pacific Rim’s integration progress, China and the U.S. should abandon 
the competitive posture of confrontation, and instead try to share the “authority” and 
enhance their collaboration. Future opportunities for the development of international 
IP law is on how US, China and EU share and balance their interests and leadership. 
And for China, joining the big-power club and gaming is the best option; and 
international norms embodying consistent interest and values, and rules containing 
sense of identity are desirable and necessary.  
 
Fourthly, great pain before the “big compromise” is inevitable and enduring; and 
there are full of many variables in the reach of that compromise, such as the time, 
contents, and turning points under the bigger context of globalization, 
power-rebalancing and multi-polarization.260 Any structural changes or substantial 
moves in the fundamentals of the international economic order and international 
politics in Pacific Rim will be clearly reflected in Pacific Rim’s international IP 
law-making and corresponding regime interactions.261 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Under the context of institutional fragmentation of international IP law in this world 
society, the international IP law in Pacific Rim is in a flux with various international 
IP legal actors, including TRIPS, WIPO, CBD, TPP, RECP, FTAAP, etc. With this 
new method of socio-legal analysis, this paper investigates the historical evolution of 
international intellectual property regimes in Pacific Rim and their interactions, 
paying particular attention to the analysis of authority and legitimacy of those 
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international IP regimes. Socio-legal research intends to view legal rules and regimes 
as embedded in their social, political, economic and cultural contexts; and it draws on 
new methods and concepts to enrich the legal studies to be more firmly rooted and 
persuasive. Through socio-legal analysis of the international IP regimes, this study 
analyzes the institutional fragmentation of international IP law, and examines the 
future institutional development of international IP regimes in the Pacific Rim.  
 
And compared to some conclusions and specific narratives here, this perspective and 
conceptual framework are more important and also maybe more innovative for a 
better understanding of the making, remaking and unmaking of international regimes 
and legal rules, under the language of institutional fragmentation of international (IP). 
With more extensive and more vigorous competition between China and US 
undergoing in Pacific Rim and beyond, this research on International IP law is only a 
start. And more comprehensive study and deep-going case study in international law 
should and could be expected, with elaborations concerning the concepts of authority 
and legitimacy under the context of institutional fragmentation of international law. 
 
